The Sovereignty agenda is not yet closed
-Suspended Central Committee members
(Unofficial Translation)
Since the unification of Eritrea with Ethiopia, the issue of Eritrea had been a time-bomb in Ethiopian politics. The attempt by the military junta and Emperor Haile- Sellasie's regime to solve the problem by force ended in a fiasco failure. It was undertakem at a staggering human and material cost. EPRDF upheld the right of self-determination as a solution to the problem. The belief that underpinned such a stance was that instead of violence and war, we should hold our own territory and stay put in our house.
A referendum took place. Eritreans living in Ethiopia participated in the referendum and chose their destiny without any obstacle. Ethiopians were divided on this issue. There are still a lot of people who still criticize what happened. Despite that, the referendum proceeded without any pressure on Eritreans in Ethiopia from the citizens of Ethiopia. It went on peacefully.
Eritrea became independent and Sha'bia established its own government. Nonetheless, contrary to our hope, Eritrea didn't become a state which could live with us peacefully. The relationship plunged into chaos. Eritrea issued a nationality law and started putting clandestine pressures on Ethiopians living there to leave their country. While this was happening in that country, they embarked on a movement to make sure that the citizens of Eritrea living in Ethiopia get dual nationality and enjoy the benefits of Ethiopian citizenship. They knew that the port, Assab, was their only weapon to put pressure upon Ethiopia. They used it and got benefits based on their terms. They made us enter into an agreement which gave them a lot of benefit from Ethiopian market and economy. Since they got a chance to exchange using Ethiopian currency, they bought coffee in birr and exported it.
Their citizens living in Ethiopia were involved in huge trading activities. Using them, they engaged in contraband and in buying gold from Ethiopia and taking it to Eritrea. They opened foreign exchange offices in their Embassy. With their slogan: Ours is ours; yours is ours as well, they went on exploiting Ethiopia.
While Sha'bia managed to act with a clear stance regarding nationality, ports, the economy, borders etc., Ethiopia did establish a firm position on these issues. There was a lot of vacillating on Ethiopia's part and rather than setting up a clear, hard and fast guideline, Ethiopia chose to follow through a path that would obscure the issue.
We can take the issue of nationality as an example. There were lots of Eritreans living in Ethiopia. They held important posts in the country's key economic sectors like the Ethiopian Commercial Bank, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, Telecommunications etc. Even after they chose to leave Ethiopia, Eritreans remained Ethiopians enjoying all the benefits due to Ethiopians. Considering this fact, it was not difficult to figure out that when a problem between Ethiopia and Eritrea arose, they might create danger to the economic well-being of Ethiopians. It is not because Eritreans are contemptible or bad that we are making such a claim. There is no doubt that when the two countries plunge into conflict, the people of the two countries favor their countries. We are saying that it was prudent to take legal action realizing the situation. This was raised since the establishment of the transitional government. No measure was taken, however.
The same was true regarding the frontier. That there might be conflict on Badme, Egala, Alitena, Za'la Ambessa and Bada was not hidden to TPLF. There were conflicts during the armed struggle with ELF and Sha'bia. When Eritrea took away lands from Ethiopia and Djbouti and drew a map, Djibouti opposed it but Ethiopia didn't say anything. Ethiopia was smooth on this issue. Even though the colonial agreements were in archives and we had no problem of experts on the field who could study the issue and forward their opinion, nothing had been done. Instead of taking a firm position based on researches and studies, Ethiopia chose to postpone the issue. It was only when the war started that the agreements were looked at. When the study was being conducted, we figured out that our border went beyond Sheshebit and Shilalo to Mount Alata Kuran and the river Maitab.
The issue of how to use ports like Assab and Massawa was also not settled. It was not just Ethiopia that wanted to use these ports. Eritrea was also in the calculation that Ethiopia could serve as a source of huge profit if it used the ports and this goaded Eritreat to talk Ethiopia into using Assab and Massawa. Further, apart from Ethiopia there was not any other country that could use these ports. As we can see, the ports of Eritrea, particularly Assab, is now left unused. The fact that Ethiopia is a land-locked country has obviously strategic and economic impact on the country. The loophole that is created by being land-locked must, therefore, be cautiously looked at Ethiopia should not be left to the mercy of a country with a port. A strategy that could avert this problem should be painstakingly designed. Unfortunately, what actually happened was the contrary. Ethiopia had begun to use only Assab and Massawa ports. The country was bent on using these ports without getting into a fair and reasonable deal.
The option of using Kenyan, Sudanese and Djiboutian ports were disregarded and the expropriation of Ethiopia properties at Eritrean ports by EPLF during the conflict was the result of this misguided move. Even the agreement reached to use the ports of Djibouti has also its own problems for it was done in a rush.
In general, the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea indicated that the countries had a basic conflict of interests. The cause of the conflict as it can be guessed was the provocative nature of the Eritrean government and the lack of a firm stand on the part of the Ethiopian government. On our part, however, right from the downfall of the Dergue we had a stand that Eritrea was our strategic enemy. Evidences which supported our argument were also found. But as they were disregarded. We finally ended up in war that we were not ready for. With this, we come to the third chapter that led to the invasion of 1998. But before discussing the third stage, I would like to raise some issues about the problem within TPLF. After the split within TPLF was publicized, Prime Minister Meles gave statements in various meetings chaired by himself. He criticized our group saying that it insisted on calling for a general assembly before settling all agendas. Besides, our group was criticized for it couldn't respect the rule of TPLF which requires the consent of the two-thirds of the meeting participants to change agendas.
However, Meles himself knows the fact that since 1999 there wasn't smooth relationship among TPLF members due to the controversy on the issue of sovereignty. The Polit -buro of TPLF had called a meeting for a candid criticism. In 1999 attempt was made to improve the relation between party members. Subsequently, the bureau came up with agendas and called for a meeting in September 2000 and until January we attempted to settle different issues on piecemeal bases. During this time we addressed ourselves to solve many issues. The prime minister couldn't deny this. The issue of Ethio-Eritrean relationship was one of those which were conferred upon. Pertaining to the relation between the two countries, the issues of citizenship use of ports, security and economy were also discussed. However, because of the occupation with war the meeting of TPLF politburo was scheduled to continue after the war. However, Ato Meles was in opposition to the procedure and the then raised agendas with the result that he came up with his own opposite ideas. However, for fear that these differences of ideas could lead to some dangerous consequences, we tolerated the opposition of Ato Meles and accepted new procedures. We were also made to accept the issue of Bonapartist tendencies which was masterminded by Ato Meles in conspiracy with member of ANDM as one agenda. Therefore, Meles is clever by half when he declares that he adhered to but blames us for not respecting the internal rule of TPLF.
Coming back to the third chapter, we held on to the position that the act of invasion by Eritrea should be announced to the public. We believed that we couldn't hide any matter from the public. We argued that lack of a firm stand, which characterized our government, should be avoided and that Ethiopian people should be united to fight the invader. The issue of invasion was presented before the parliament and the latter, as is known, passed a decision that if defending the nation's sovereignty in peaceful way couldn't work, war should be launched as a last resort.
The Eritrean government had enhanced its capacity of war. The Eritrean government was a ware that Ethiopia was not ready for war and this made the Asmara government refuse any move towards peace. It denounced the proposal of America and Rwanda. It also refused to accept the framework agreement. It was inviting Ethiopia to war in a pompous manner by occupying out territory.
Even if our country was a victim of aggression, the government didn't take the right stand on the Technical Arrangement. After being presented for discussion to the public, it was found out that the Technical Arrangement was against the sovereignty of Ethiopia. Before the Technical Arrangement document was presented to the public it was first debated on by members of EPRDF politburo then by the Central Committee of each EPRDF member parties and finally by the council of EPRDF. The prime minister tried to turn every stone to convince the politburo of EPRDF and the central committee of TPLF into accepting the Technical Arrangement when his argument for the benefit of the arrangement was met by serious challenges. Then he advanced a rebuttal argument that not accepting the arrangement would annoy America and tough measures would be taken against us. We had a firm stand that unless an arrangement that defended our sovereignty was presented we would keep on using force to defend our sovereignty. The victory scored can testify as to whose stand was right.
Today the prime minister is repeatedly saying that so far he was but simply accepting the majority despite his interest. This is far from truth. The decision on the arrangement was first passed by the politburo of EPRDF in a series of debates that took many days. The prime minister was defeated by ten votes to two. If he really were obedient to the majority like he is saying now, he would bow to the decision passed by the majority. But, Ato Meles, after his defeat in the politburo, was stubborn enough to call for another meeting of TPLF Central Committee members. He was not successful here either. This embarassing incident made Meles lose. He couldn't find any place where he could voice his opposition. He was not willing to use the media for he very well knew that he would be met by bitter opposition from the people. If he dared to present his position to the public, his political life would definitely have been cut short. If we were really after power, as the current scandals have it, we could have exposed the shame of Meles at that time. But we were held back by our conscience from doing this. At the time our country was invaded and our army was at war. Raising such dissension was not good. We chose to commit ourselves to protect our country.
Though our differences were exposed during the debate on the Technical Arrangement in the summer of 1999, there were clues of disagreement right in the wake of the invasion by the Eritrean government. In addition, the issue of using a special budget to protect our sovereignty was opposed by those who argued that such a move would defy the agreement reached with the IMF. This was an indication that the country was prone to sanction only because it uses the resource of its people. This had an impact on the preparation to repel the invasion.
We couldn't accept the Technical Arrangement at the expense of our sovereignty. We determined to pay any kind of sacrifice to oust the invading Eritrean army. The solidarity of high caliber that we exhibited enbloed us to score a great victory at a low cost. The Eritrean army was vanquished embarrassingly. While our army was fighting tooth and nail, the two countries were urged to sign the peace agreement. In Algiers, the peace agreement was signed. As a result, the Ethiopian army was redeployed to the territory which was part of Ethiopian jurisdiction before the invasion. But our army didn't return to the territory that was de jure regarded as Ethiopian according to the agreement reached between Menilik II and Italy. Some domains of this territory are still under the occupation of the Eritrean government.
Are we really then on safe ground to say that the question regarding our sovereignty is completely settled? This is the most fundamental question worth asking. We have to sort out this question and come up with perspective. Because to believe that the controversy is fully settled is a misconception that will lead to destructive consequences. Very recently Ato Addisu Legesse gave a statement that the contention about sovereignty was dealt with eight months ago. We, however, opposed this statement and put forward our argument. But, Addisu Legese repudiated our stand saying that it is a dead issue.
The reality is otherwise. In our view the issue of sovereignty was not solved. First, let us start with the view that the issue is finished totally.
According to EPRDF's usual way of doing things, every course of action is evaluated. The issue of sovereignty is one of the major accomplishments in the past decade in the country. It was a great chapter in the history of the long-time liberation struggle of the country, and the peoples of Ethiopia exhibited an incomparable unity from one corner to the other. The accomplishment was undertaken during the time when our country was less prepared for defense and had a small number of troops while the enemy had manifold preparations for defense and exceeded ours in the number of troops. It was a liberation struggle that was accomplished without any support as such and under enormous pressure and sanctions. The victory was scored with the potential of the people alone. This should be evaluated and the process of the situation and the leadership should be evaluated. We say that the question of where we should head to in the future must be determined.
We believe, on our part, that evaluating the past and the future on the basis of sovereignty will help to show many things. It will help to see what our foreign policy, especially our relationship with America and neighboring countries, looks like and enable us to pinpoint how we should safeguard our political and economic sovereignty. It will show us what the national defense and security looks like and pinpoint how we should go about it. During the struggle for sovereignty, a national unity that had never been witnessed was exhibited. What our people expected was the strengthening of this unity and the continuation of the same spirit in development and reconstruction of the nation. In less than eight months this unity has began to fall apart. We say that this point deserves evaluation.
Meles Zenawi has written much on the vice of Bonapartism which he conspired. By using this lopsided glass of Bonapartism, he wrote a mythology which he called gimgema (evaluation). But he failed to evaluate the issue of sovereignty. It seems that his pen failed to say something. Realizing that he will be questioned why, his reply was that we had to concentrate on internal issues since the sovereignty issue was an external matter. The key issue for which tens of thousands paid their lives was categorized as ''external'' according to the standards of FDRE prime minister. How long can Meles and the submissive palace group which he leads retreat from their shameful stands?
As we have mentioned above the question of sovereignty is a closed agenda. The border issue, one of the causes of the war, has been taken to the international court. Due to this the war stopped but it couldn't bring about a durable and long-lasting solution. Since a long-lasting solution was not achieved, Ethiopia and Eritrea are in a state of war and on their own guard excepting the fact that they stopped exchange of fires. It is, therefore, too dangerous to think that the question of sovereignty is a closed chapter. If there is such an outlook among EPRDF leaders, it means that it damages the preparation of our armed forces. Loosening may also follow. Apart from that a rash demobilization may follow. It is known that the demobilization agenda has been raised in the aftermath of the May victory.
America was said to have prescribed the reduction of defense budget which otherwise would be followed by the withholding of aid. The prime minister has been pressing forward on the agenda after he had returned from his visit to America. A meaningful decrease of defense budget can be realized only by demobilizing a significant portion of the armed forces. It should be known that before the border issue is settled, compromising the potential and preparation of the army for the sake of aid of from the World Bank and the IMF is a dangerous action.
Western powers and their journalists were laughing at us saying that we were fighting for a rugged plateau and drought-stricken plot of land. In a central committee debate on whether to accept the Technical Arrangements, some members went to the extent of echoing this differently. It was not surprising America argued that we were fighting for a rugged plateau because our sovereignty was less important to them according to their global strategy.
But, whether it be gorges or mountains, they are our sovereign lands, our dignity and our identity. Accordingly, the peoples of Ethiopia paid dearly by sacrificing the lives of their sons and daughters. Because the dry plots of land are less important and our sovereignty and the region's strategic importance are meaningless in their own eyes we feel threatend that they will undermine the procedures of the international tribunal and cover up our basic issues. The powers that can do this are not small in number. Sha'bia prefers this approach because it realizes that it is going to lose land and America will prefer mediation instead of a genuine arbitration and justice. The submissive palace group has already shown its surrender. All these show that the issue is at stake.
What can we do if both parties agree beforehand to be neither winners nor losers and go to the court to stage their own drama like the football game between Cameroon and Egypt?
Some signals pointing to this fact have been exhibited beginning from the aftermath of May while the blood of our martyrs is fresh. The agenda of normalization of relations has been raised. Everything that may be done may not be clear to the Ethiopian people overnight but it is usual for Americans to introduce what they want little by little. Without calling it normalization, some non-governmental organizations may carry it out under a pretext. In a situation where the issues of border and compensation are not settled and properly established, the interference of the normalization agenda will gradually take the main agenda and leave it behind the curtain.
So many activities may come to the forefront in the name of normalization of relations. We would like to mention some of them which we believe are important. One of the questions that may be forwarded to us is to the use of Eritrean ports. Using the ports would automatically mean giving Sha'bia dollars. And Sha'bia should by no means get money from us to wage war against us. The other issue that will be raised in the name of normalization is the return of the property of deported Eritreans and their return to Ethiopia to collect their properties. On top of that, our immigration policy or its implementation may be loosened. Together with these, it is very much clear that the issue of security threat will follow. It is beyond uncertainty that with the movement of people and goods through the border, the ports and airports, the security apparatus of Sha'bia will infiltrate into Ethiopia. This will primarily hurt every citizen who contributed in expertise, money, and skill and especially the merchants and the bourgeoisie will face a double blow. On the one hand, they will be targeted like every citizen, and on the other, they will be mistreated when they use the Assab port. We believe that normalization of relations shouldn't totally come since it sidelines the basic issues. It is also saddled with the above-mentioned dangers.
Meanwhile, what if a verdict on the border is passed according to the treaties of Emperor Menelik II and Italy? Let us look into it. This would mean that we would go further deep into Eritrean territory. Here, there are two options. Either Sha'bia will have to abide by the decision or it will refuse to accept it.
If it is the first option, that will be fine. Those of us who have a good experience of the behavior of Sha'bia believe that the possibility of this option is not narrow. If that is the case, we will have to go back to war without our will to ensure our sovereignty. We don't want to enter this situation. But what can we do if the option the enemy has provided us is only this?
The determinant factor will be whether the army and the people will retain their capability. If we loosen our strength, it will be dangerous. But if we struggle against the pressure of the IMF and the World Bank and remain retain full potential, we will be able to face the forthcoming dangers and we will be in a good position to respond to them.
[Opinions in this article are solely that of the writer.]