The Enigma of the Ethiopia-Somalia Relations and The Islamic Factor
By: Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia
The peoples of Ethiopia and Somalia have a lot in common when it comes to physiognomy, culture, social organization, and thousands of years of interaction, although this contiguous network was at times uneasy and many times turned into violent clashes.
In contemporary history, the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia is markedly exemplified by the 1964 and 1977 wars that were, by and large, provoked by the Somali irredentist regimes who were supporting the secession of Ogaden from Ethiopia. If we deleve into early and medieval history, we can also examine confrontations between the Somalis and the Ethiopians as far back as the middle of the 14th century. These early armed clashes were compounded by Jihad (Islamic holy war) that were meant to counter the expansionist Christian kingdom of Ethiopia (Abyssinia proper). The pioneers of Jihad were the Walasa Dynasty of Adal who managed to control the strategic port of Zeila, which, in turn, enabled them to expand Islam in the north-eastern Awash valley. They effectively united Muslims and successfully converted the pastoral Somali to Islam, and in the conflict between Adal and the Ethiopian kingdom, the Somalis proved to be the most vital fighting force.
By early 1400s, however, the Abyssinians of Ethiopia, at least briefly, controlled the Harar plateau (historical assumptions that Ethiopians first came to Harar with Menelik in the 1890s is thus false), but in 1450 Adal reinforcements recaptured Harar. Following the recovery of the Adals, perpetual wars that devastated highland Ethiopia throughout the 15th and 16th centuries would be ignited. The war ignition is largely attributed to Ahmed Gragn ( from Adal) who also had a huge Somali contingent in his army. In fact, in the late 1520s , the Gragn forces crossed the river Dukem and this was a wake up call for the Ethiopian king Lebne Dingil who soon mobilized his forces (close to 200,000) from Tigray, Agaw, Gojjam, Begemdir, Shewa and the rest of his domain. Gragn, on the other hand, had assembled only 12,000 troops but he had a distinct advantage of the Turkish muskets which the Lebne Dingil forces were lacking.
Gragn was not only victorious. He routed the Ethiopian king, destroyed a sizable of the Lebne Dingil forces, burned down Churches, and took booty unparalleled in Ethiopian history. The Gragn campaign to destroy Ethiopia was conducted in the name of Islam and Jihad and to be sure there were some Arabs (especially from Mahra in southern Arabia) among the rank-and-file of his forces who came to assist the Jihad wars.
Ethiopia resurrected from its death following the holy wars of Gragn in the 1540s when king Gelawdewos, the son of Lebne Dingil, assumed power and also enjoyed Portuguese military assistance. In 1543 he defeated and killed Gragn despite the enormity of the latter's forces, and peace reigned in Ethiopia for the next two decades.
The Jihad wars make sense vis-a-vis the Crusades and the history of the 15th century Ethiopia, but in the 21st century they are undoubtedly reactionary. Neither Jihad nor fundamentalism could serve as political programs for sound civic transformation; in the era of diverse cultures and secular states, they are surely anathema to development.
Against the brief anecdotal account made above, we can now deal with the rather enigmatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia and the recent political developments in the Horn, and we shall see this in conjunction with the so-called terrorists in Somalia. But first lets first have a glance on a relevant statement that I have made in 1997:
"One may ask whether Islam is a problem in the Horn of Africa. Since its inception, Islam was in the Horn; the first followers of Mohammed were well received by the Aksumite king [Armah] in the early 6th century, and after 632 A.D., Islam spread fast...in the Horn of Africa and in the entire northern Africa. And although there were conflicts between Moslems and Christians in the Horn, there were also a significant period of peaceful coexistence. In some instances, Moslems and Christians intermingled, intermarried, and lived together in a community...To be sure, Islam, like other major religions, preaches 'peace on earth'.If Islam is not a problem, can we then say Islamic fundamentalism is a threat in the Horn of Africa. This question must be examined against the complexity of the Horn itself. By now the reader must bear in mind that the commodity called peace is rare in the Horn of Africa. Sadly and regretfully, Eritrea and Ethiopia are about to go to war against Sudan and both have condemned the Omar al Beshir regime as Islamic fundamentalist. on top of this, last August (and now again on December 1996) Ethiopia pursued the Al Itihad al Islamia (Islamic Union) in Somalia. So the Ethiopian forces will be deployed on both the eastern frontier against Somalia and the western frontier against Sudan. Eritrea also may either directly confront and engage Sudanese forces or assist the Beja Congress and other opposition forces to fight the Sudanese government."
The above statement was featured in the African Link magazine and the analysis was made based on the then existing political scenario in the Horn although now we know that Sudan was not attacked by a consortium of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda due to undpredictable twist of historical irony that saved Sudan: War broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea; Uganda was enmeshed in its own civil strife and in the Congo crisis.
However, as shown in the statement, the Ethiopian government was after the Al Itihad since 1996, and to some extent the Ethiopian move is justified because the Al Itihad could have been responsible for the bomb sabotage in Addis Ababa and the assassination attempt of Abdul Mejid Hussien, former Ethiopian minster of transport, and this same group may have been involved in the bombardment of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam. But in the wake of the September 11 tragedy, the Al Itihad al Islamia may not be a force to be reckon with.
On November 4, 2001, David B. Ottaway and Thomas A. Ricks wrote "Somalia Draws Anti-Terrorist Focus" in the Washington Post, and per these journalists, "the Christian-dominated Ethiopian government has expressed a desire to work closely with Washington to eliminate the threat also posed to itself by al Queda and its local Somali Islamic ally, al Itihad al Islamia...Ethiopia has offered to use its own troops to attack al Queda bases, according to Ethiopian diplomatic sources."
Ottaway and Ricks' report need to be carefully and critically examined. I personally don't think that the Ethiopian government ever claimed that its composition is predominantly Christian. But the Ethiopian government may have miscalculated in offering its resources against the al Itihad or al Queda bases in Somalia in light of the absence of credible evidence.
Exactly a month after the Washington Post story, Elizabeth Blunt for the BBC and Paul Redfern for The Nation implied the non-existence of al Queda bases in Somalia. Ms. Blunt said, "al-Itihad has fragmented and is no longer the force it was," and she further claimed that "one of the outsiders best placed to assess the truth of the allegations is David Stephen, the UN Secretary General's special representative for Somalia, and he is dubious."
In fact, David Stepehen himself have the following to say: "I can't comment on the specific rumours -- all I will say is that there is a lot of speculation. No one has come up with evidence which I have found convincing that there are, for example, terrorist camps in Somalia."
From a slightly different perspective, Paul Redfern tells us that "Mr. Meles Zenawi, has publicly urged Washington to cooperate with him on the war against fundamentalists, including the group known as Ittihad al Islamia." Redfern adds, "such a strategy could be risky, experts warn... that the Americans could be dragged into Ethiopia's battle against separatists in the Ogaden region and become embroiled in a regional conflict."
As I have indicated on a number of occasions, Ethiopia's fight against a phantom enemy in Somalia will further complicate the enigma between the two brotherly peoples and sisterly nations. On the contrary, and in spite of al Itihad's "high profile" performance, the Ethiopian government must pursue a policy of reconciliation with the Somalis. Of course, the challenge and diffcicult task for Ethiopians at this juncture is to deal with various Somali factions who are unable to reconcile their differences and come up with a national consensus. But there is some hope.
The interim president of Somalia, Abdulkasim Salat Hassan and the prime minister Hassan Abshir Farah are trying their best to iron out differences among the various Somali political groupings by convening a National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia, and both leaders are determined to root out, if at all, the vestiges of terrorism in their country. These leaders need help and cooperation from the African Union, the European Union, Ethiopia and the United States, and with a successful dialogue in Somalia, which I believe will be the agenda of the 8th IGAD summit in Somalia, the country will be resurrected and Ethiopia will enjoy peace at its borders. It is for this obvious reason that Mr. Farah sojourned to Ethiopia to conduct talks with the Ethiopian government where he had "a very successful meeting with Meles Zenawi."
If Ethiopia and the United States cooperate with the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia, on top of the agenda of the interim government and the political realities therein, they need to seriously consider cross-cultural and comparative-perception approach which is embedded in the diagnosis of meaning, motive, and intentions that have to do with the built-in cultural disposition of the Somali nation (and by extension, the Ethiopian nation).
I must submit to the reader that it is easy for me (as a scholar) to make an ex post facto judgment compared to a government official or diplomat who would rather encounter political hurdles tainted in paradoxes and dilemmas, but the latter can (to the extent possible) operate within a given framework by expending his/her utmost political skills. My ex post facto judgments, in this context, is that the U.S. and Ethiopia should not direct their forces against the Somali people and by default destroy the initiatives of the TNG. If they do, it would be tantamount to inflicting wound on an already shattered people and choke a nation that is unable to resuscitate.
The whole world knows that the Somalis have entered into a quagmire that literally suffocated them, and as one Somali educator (Ali A. Abdi quoting Afrax, 1994) aptly puts it, "the entire fabric of the Somali society has been damaged, the existence of the whole nation has sunk into a deep, dark sea of unimaginable human and material disaster, and the communal mind of the people is in comma."
It is morally and politically untenable and legally unpalatable to try to suffocate a people that is in comma. Both in terms of political gain and fundamental human rights point of view, it would be advisable to uphold the peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Horn.
[Opinions in this article are solely that of the writer.]