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The economic argument which has been used even after the detigrainisation of the TPLF is the greatest insult to the memory of our young brothers and sisters who, without ever savouring the joy of youth hood, love and marriage, gave their life so that our country and people can enjoy full freedom, democracy and justice.
Second, despite the so-called universities and factories, the Tigraian peasantry who has paid the huge sacrifice continues to suffer from malnutrition, injustice, misadministration, and autocratic rule. Third, on the top of this Tigrai has been a victim of invasion and wanton destruction by the TPLF spoilt EPLF. What can be more humiliating than the bombardment of Mekelle and Addigrat, the total destruction of Zala'ambassa and the destruction of the forest in western Tigrai which, experts said, would need a century to be in its original position. More importantly, by coalescing with the devil, the unfortunate Tigraians have played a major negative role in alienating Tigraians from their fellow Ethiopians.
Last but not least, as if Tigrai had not punished in the past foreign Ethiopia's enemies, Tigrai has been obliged to abandon its territories instead of recovering its forcibly taken territories by Italian fascists. And what is more nauseating in this unbelievable betrayal is that the forced cession takes places under the command of those who caused the death of hundreds of thousands of Tigraians for the sake of their personal power and especially for the independence of Eritrea
The proponents of economic "trickle-down" should be told categorically that it is not in our culture to let ourselves humiliated for "economic reasons". They should be told that if Ethiopians had been so subservient as to be fooled by "economic benefits", they could have accepted peacefully fascist Italy's humiliating domination. However despite the huge amount of money fascist Italy invested in the construction of Roads(I am obliged to speak of roads because roads are being presented as justification to accept the cession of territories and the waiver of our sovereign right by the EPRDF), our grand fathers had made it clear that it was un-ethiopian to abandon their freedom and the independence of their country in "exchange for economic benefits". It was precisely for this reason that they had led a life and death struggle against the enemy during five years to be finally crowned with completely victory in 1941 although such a victory had been deviated by Haile sellassie's co-operation with the British which turned the country into a practically British occupied territory.
This is to say that the unprecedented humiliating loss that Tigrai has been undergoing can never be offset by malfunctioning factories which are any away the personal properties and cash-cows of the dignitaries of the regime and their political vassals. It would have been hundreds of times more beneficial to Tigrai if none of its sons and daughters had been sacrificed . Because, not only Ethiopia continues to be the poorest country in the world despite its economic potential to feed the whole Africa, but it is not unimaginable that Tigraians can lose their country after losing part of their territory. The constitutionnalisation of the so-called the right of self determination including secession should not be seen as something innocuous. Who can seriously believe that those who are not ashamed of ceding Tigraian territory will refrain from disintegrating the whole country? Should we consider the interdiction of the teaching of Ethiopian history and Amharic as a national teaching language as the advent of real democracy in Ethiopia or is it a malicious policy of euthanising Ethiopia? How should one interpret Ethiopia's masters insistence on self determination and secession which contrasts with their enthusiastic concern for Eritrean "history", unity and independence? How should one interpret their advocacy and love for Eritrea which contrasts with their hardly veiled hate and contempt of Ethiopia(the proof is the infamous answer: they( the illegally ousted Tigraians) say that my mother is Eritrean and my father is something)?
The result of the denationalisation and its corollary divide and conquer policy has made the Ethiopian state very fragile to the extent of being easily conquered by secessionist shifta. It is true that this recurrent fragility was also the main reason which enabled past shifta to take the reign of power and proclaim themselves king of Ethiopia. However, secessionist shifta differ fundamentally from past shifta which were real Robins of Hoods of the people. The new Marxist shifta distinguished themselves by their boundless love and concern for Eritrea. And it is this love under the mask of Ethiopianness which explains the illegal and arrogant waiver of Ethiopian right of maritime outlet and the cession of its territories. Before examining the political generosity of Ethiopian masters towards Eritrea, it is indispensable to substantiate the argument that the Ethiopian government has out-Eritread Eritrea.
That the Ethiopian government is more Eritrean than the Eritreans themselves is something which is curious to Eritreans, exasperating to Ethiopians and bizarre to the outside world. If we look at the Ethiopian side, for most Tigraians it has always been a bitter pill to swallow that Ethiopian history be revised for the sake of facilitating Eritrean secession. This was especially true to the members of the old Tigraian aristocracy which were dubbed by TPLF leadership as bootlickers of the Shewan aristocracy. For the rest of Ethiopia, it has been seen as a tigre ( the word tigre meaning every body who speaks tigrigna) conspiracy against Ethiopia. As regards the tigrigna speaking intellectuals, there have been various ways of looking at it. Some thought and think still that what matters is that their relatives and village men are in power no matter what happens to the vital national interest of Ethiopia. These are the ones who argue unashamedly about the relevancy of the colonial treaties. Belatedly they have started saying that Ethiopia has no other choice than to accept the ruling the arbitration tribunal even if that mean the cession of large territories to Eritrea. Although their actions speak louder than their words, they try in vain to preach the prevalence of democracy in Ethiopia. Of course as political cadres, they cannot say otherwise. They tell us unashamedly that Dalol full of precious minerals but also extremely rich in geothermal power is more than 60 kilo meters away from the coastline as to be affected by the cession of Ethiopian territories to Eritrea. OUT-HERODING HEROD
However, there is no gainsaying that Dalol is what exactly the EPLF covets. The war between the Ethiopian army and the EPLF on December 1997 was conducted at Dalol and for the control of Dalol. But as usual thanks to the now illegally ousted Tigraians not only EPLF colonels were captured and imprisoned but EPLF leaders asked their release arguing that they knew nothing about the war and if there was a war it was the work of junior officials without permission from their superiors.
That said, for the bulk of the Tigraian intellectuals however, the Eritrea-favourable position of the Ethiopian government is simply incomprehensible and frustrating.
On the other hand, the Eritreans' view of the Ethiopian government is a funny one. Some of them believe seriously that their president commands the Ethiopian prime minister. For others, it is quite natural that their nephew work for the interest of Eritrea. The second being a foolish one because based on simple primordial identity, I think the first deserves more attention. And it is with regard to this that I intend to slightly modify the first view and demonstrate my thesis that Ethiopian strong man is not at all commanded by the Eritrean leader but that he is as concerned about Eritrea as the Eritrean leader; no more no less.
I will start my demonstration by a quotation from an article of professor Asmarom Legesse posted in Dehai's web site who, in his article entitled "Ethiopian intellectuals who seek to derail the peace process", writes:
"...TPLF did not grant Eritrea its independence. The reality is that the liberation fronts that formed the new government of Ethiopia acquiesced to Eritrea's de facto independence after the Eritrean people's Liberation Front(EPLF) militarily evicted Ethiopian Army from its territory on May 24, 1991, and its mechanised brigades marched side by side with Ethiopian forces all the way to Addis Ababa to bring down the hated regime of Mengistu Hailemariam. TPLF was certainly not in a position, in 1991, to stop Eritrea from taking what was rightfully hers".That the TPLF granted Eritrea its independence is too obvious to require more explanation. Because the prime minister's position towards Eritrea before and after its independence speaks for itself. The question whether or not TPLF had the possibility to stop Eritrean independence is therefore completely irrelevant. Because not only TPLF had saved the EPLF from complete annihilation by the red star campaign in 1982 but also Eritrean independence has become one of the most important political programmes of the TPLF since 1984. It is essential also to remember that there were times when the TPLF was opposed to the EPLF's demand for reinstatement of the federation as a condition for laying down arms. The fact that a new leadership took the helm of power within the TPLF in 1984 had however led to a complete political about face of the EPLF. Not only Eritrean rebels believed in the possibility of independence but also they toyed with the idea of economically colonising Ethiopia if the TPLF succeeded in taking power in Ethiopia.The presence of EPLF mechanised brigades in streets of Addis Ababa has a sense only if we look at it from this angle. However incredible it might have appeared, the first thing that the TPLF did when it took power was to give one hundred fifty million birr to Eritrea under the pretext that it was a money taken from Eritrean banks by the Derg. At the same time the EPLF started to confiscate the property of Ethiopians in Eritrea, to rob and even kill members of the Ethiopian army whereas as Legesse acknowledges members of the mechanised brigades of the EPLF army were respected hosts of TPLF dominated Ethiopia. The TPLF leaders did not say anything when Ethiopians were treated in the most atrocious manner in Eritrea. Hoping that the TPLF leaders might be concerned by their inhumane treatment in Eritrea, Ethiopians asked for help to some of the TPLF leaders. The answer they received was Eritreans had the right to do what they wanted in their country. However when in 1998 some Eritreans considered dangerous to the security of Ethiopia were sent to Eritrea, the same TPLF leaders were opposed to such a measure dictated by national security. The TPLF did not limit itself to facilitating the independence of Eritrea. It even used the so-called parliament of the transitional government to adopt a proclamation enabling the government to borrow about two hundred eighty million (I forgot if it was dollar or birr) from international financial organisations on behalf of Eritrea because Eritrea did not have international juridical personality to borrow in its name. Besides, the fact that the TPLF continued to spoil Eritrea for seven years was a proof which showed how much the dream of the EPLF to colonise Ethiopia economically became a realty. We know that this was not because of the EPLF's strength. Very far from it. But assuming that the EPLF army were stronger than the TPLF army, I can see no reason why it should be allowed to exploit the economy of a country which it considers as its number one enemy.
Legesse says that TPLF could not stop Eritrea from taking what is "rightfully hers". Was it then because Addis Ababa belonged to Eritrea that EPLF brigades took control Addis Ababa? Although, one can argue safely that the regime of Mengistu Hailemariam defeated itself, it is however the TPLF which gave a coup de grâce to the Ethiopian army. The presence of EPLF troops in Menelik's palace can only be explained by other long term political motives between EPLF and TPLF leaders. The collusion of the two leaders is of course diversely appreciated by foreign observers. For Roland Marechal who made a field research in Eritrea in the wake of the declaration of Eritrean independence:
" Despite its heavy economic and monetary dependence on Ethiopia, it is the EPLF which commands in its relations with Addis Ababa. The power of Meles Zenawi is so fragile that it cannot do without the military help of the EPLF in case there be a problem not to mention that the same EPLF can block the bulk of Ethiopian import export should there be a conflict between the two countries..."(Erythrée: an 01 in politique africaine No. 50 June 1993, P. 29).The idea that EPLF commands TPLF has been a talk of the town in Erittrea from 1991 to 1998. No doubt that the author got his information from Eritreans. For others, it is not true that the EPLF leader commands the TPLF leader. The fact is that the TPLF leader is a pro Eritrean. Thus examining the causes of the Eritrean invasion of Ethiopia, Jon Abbink writes:"The border dispute is all about the politics of state survival. Eritrea as a new independent state was always closely linked to the present EPRDF regime in Addis Ababa and was crucially assisted by the latter in political and economic terms "(The Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute, African affairs, vol. 97, No. 389, October 1998, P. 556)Quoting an article written by L. Santoro, published in Christian science monitor of the 22 June 1998 under the title of "at the root of an odd African war: money" Abbink writes"many observers see this(the invasion) as the central reason for the timing of the conflict. By forcefully bringing up the border issue, the Eritrean government has put pressure on the Ethiopian leadership and tried to force to return to a more Eritrea-favourable position by way of inducing the pro-Eritrean factions in the ruling EPRDF to assert themselves"(emphasis mine). (ibid., P. 558).This shows the existence of a political division of the EPRDF leadership between Pro Eritrean and pro-Ethiopian factions. The idea is that the pro Eritrean factions of the EPRDF led by the prime minister were no more in a position to impose their position on the pro-Ethiopia forces when Eritrea opted for monetary independence from Ethiopia. However, when the pro-Ethiopian faction of the EPRDF said no to a continued Eritrean parasitization of Ethiopia, the TPLF spoilt EPLF was not to let it self pushed around. It had to resort to military intimidation which was of course followed by a large scale and devastating invasion. The reaction of the EPRDF leadership towards the invasion was, not surprisingly, different. The pro Ethiopian forces demanded that immediate measures be taken to repulse the enemy. Per contra, the pro-Eritrea forces presented phoney arguments intended to enable the EPLF to buy time to dig its defensive trenches. One can argue with hindsight that the sudden anti EPLF position of the pro-Ethiopian forces of the TPLF indicates that they had been under a political hypnosis for twenty five years. This was clearly seen in the fundamental difference of approach to the war and to the anti Ethiopian Algiers Agreement.The invasion was an aggression in accordance with article 3 of the 1974 resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the United Nations General Assembly. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace which entails international responsibility in accordance with article 1 of the 1970 resolution 2625(XXV) of the United Nations General Assembly. When a state is victim of aggression it should seise the Security council so that the latter can take the necessary measures against the aggressor. When Eritrea bombarded the town of Mekelle killing several dozens school children and wounding more than one hundred forty people, everybody expected that the Ethiopian government would seise the Security council of Eritrean invasion of Ethiopia. However, the pro-Eritrean faction of the EPRDF decided to send military planes to bomb a military post in Eritrea reportedly killing one person. The reason was very clear. Eritrea had to be given a pretext so that it would argue that it bombarded Mekelle and then Addigrat in a response to the Ethiopian bombing of its capital. This was why the international Media said that there had been a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the result that Eritrea had inflicted a heavy human loss on Ethiopia.
In actual fact as the pro-Eritrea faction of the EPRDF was the only one which could seise the Security council, they preferred to trade with the Eritrean leadership empty accusations and counter accusations in a bid to hoodwink the international public opinion that all sides had their version of the story. As a matter of fact there was only one true version of the story. That the pro-Eritrean faction within the EPRDF was skilfully discharging its mission of protecting Eritrea from being accused of aggression. The irony is that the Security Council which gave a tacit consent to the Eritrean occupation of Ethiopian territory as a fait accompli was very swift to impose arms embargo when the pro-Ethiopian forces of the EPRDF managed to launch a counter offensive which led to lightening victory of the Ethiopian army.
Nonetheless, the counter offensive was called off inconclusively by the Pro-Eritrean factions of the EPRDF. With the benefit of hindsight, one can argue that the inconclusive calling off of the offensive was another way of saying that the counter offensive should not have been taken in the first place. The proof is the prime minister's sardonic answer to a question by a western journalist who asked him why he did not want to order a counter offensive against Eritrea:
"For the last three thousand years Ethiopian leaders used to take immediate measures to ward off an enemy who invaded their country. We don't want to follow that example. For economic reasons we want to solve the problem by peaceful means"Just two days before the calling off of the offensive, the American government warned Ethiopia against occupying the Eritrean capital. However no sooner that the Ethiopian government said it had no one to receive orders from than it "complied" by calling off the offensive. But the drama continued: President Clinton suggested that the war be immediately stopped and the border be demarcated on the basis of colonial treaties. The question is that how can Clinton a law professor can ask for border demarcation on the basis non existent and irrelevant colonial treaties. Who asked him to make this plea on behalf of Eritrea?Some months after the cessation of the war, the pro-Eritrean faction of the EPRDF signed the Algiers Agreement which has completely written off the Ethiopian military victory and the sacrifice of the several tens of thousands of Ethiopians who died for the mother land. The pro-Eritrean faction of the EPRDF saved the EPLF twice in less than a year. The Algiers Agreement is a completely diplomatic victory of the EPLF despite its military humiliating defeat. The Algiers Agreement is also a personal defeat for the pro-Ethiopia faction because it was deprived of its victory in which it showed, not surprisingly, exceptional military excellence. This led again to a schism between the two factions with result that the military victorious faction was politically outwitted. The unfortunate Tigraians expected that their difference with the prime minister could be solved legally. It is true that their demand was in keeping with the constitution of the TPLF. It is true also that the Audit Commission of the TPLF was legally competent to rule who was right. And the same commission ruled that the pro-Ethiopia factions was right. However, both the members of the Audit Commission and the pro-Ethiopia faction were so naive as to believe that power politics in the third world and especially in Ethiopia could obey to the principles of rule of law. The result of such naivety was the illegal ouster and imprisonment of those heroes who deserve decoration and honour because, despite their responsibility of weakening Ethiopia, they have understood that they had been mistaken irremissibly and were possibly ready to rectify it had they carried the day. The victory of the pro-Eritrean faction over the pro-Ethiopian faction of the EPRDF has led to the conclusion of the Algiers Agreement which is not only unconstitutional but also a flagrant violation of Ethiopian independence and sovereignty..
The question that every concerned Ethiopian should raise is: can an unconstitutional agreement signed by a government which has lost its raison d'être be binding on Ethiopia.
That the Algiers Agreement between Ethiopia's strongman and his Eritrean counter part is not only unconstitutional but also runs counter to Ethiopia's independence and territorial integrity is an established truth. Before discussing the validity of this agreement under international law, let us examine why the Ethiopian government has preferred to submit the case to an arbitration tribunal and not to the International Court of Justice(ICJ) or to a mediation. UNCONSTITUTIONAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The aim of the present farcical drama at the Hague is not to determine the respective territorial rights between Eritrea and Ethiopia as one would like to convince us. If that was the case, it should have been raised not now but just before the independence of Eritrea. The main aim now is to cede Ethiopian territories under the pretext of border demarcation. In fact it is not the Border Commission which is to determine if there is a territorial cession or not. It is the EPRDF government which has already accepted the territorial cession when it signed the Algiers Agreement. The fact that it preferred to "submit the case" to an arbitration tribunal (don't confuse it with a court) is not innocent. Before demonstrating the ulterior political motive of submitting the case to an arbitration tribunal, let us start by examining others forms of border dispute resolution so that a comparison of these forms can help understand the bad faith of the Ethiopian government. Although there are various political forms of resolving a frontier dispute, the most known ones are mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement. When states choose among these possibilities, it is essential to know that there are political consideration behind the choice. All the three may have their advantages and disadvantages. Let us examine this point very quickly. THE MOTIVES BEHIND THE DECISION TO SUBMIT THE BORDER DEMARCATION TO AN ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
As a rule mediation is the most preferable way of resolving frontier disputes. Because as Nomi Schwiesow writes:
" a mediating state offers not only its good offices but also specific suggestions of possible forms of a settlement for a conflict. Disputing states who request or consent to mediation are not bound to accept the proffered solution, as they are when they submit to arbitration. For this reason, mediation proceedings may be accepted more readily than arbitration . In bringing the disputants states to agreement on a particular solution mediators have not the same legal force that supports arbitrators. But, since mediators, to be successful are compelled to discover politically acceptable solutions, the effects of their intervention may well be more lasting than the decision of arbitrators" (Mediation, in the International Regulation of Frontier disputes edited by Evan Luard, 1970, P. 42)There is no doubt that mediation is preferable one because the disputants states will feel all winners. In the case of mediation, they are not obliged to accept a decision which flouts their national interest. Per contra, an arbitration is a binding one even if the arbitration award be incompatible with the vital national interest of one of the disputants. Like arbitration, a judicial settlement is also a binding one. The difference between an arbitration and a judicial settlement is that in the case of judicial settlement, the International court of Justice is supposed to dispose of the case in accordance with the strict observance of international law. Unless asked so by the parties, the court cannot decide a case ex aequo et bono, which means a decision in accordance with equity or principles of justice and not in accordance with the law.There is no doubt that in the Ethiopian-Eritrea case, the best venue is the International court of Justice. I say that the International Court of Justice would be have been preferable because the court would be led to determine first of all the relevant international laws to dispose of the case. It would certainly ask whether Eritrea is a colony of Ethiopia; whether its independence is the result of secession or decolonization, whether it is in accordance with international law to selectively exhume defunct colonial treaties while rejecting other defunct treaties, whether it is legal to nullify all UN resolutions regarding the Ethiopianness of Eritrea, and last but not least whether it is legal for EPLF and EPRDF to violate the Cairo resolution of 1964 which stipulates that African states should not call into question the frontiers which they inherited from the colonial powers at the time of their accession to independence. The Court would also be obliged to explore all issues of law even those not raised by the parties. Certainly , the EPRDF/EPLF position which regards Eritrea as the colony of Ethiopia would have been rejected immediately. Because it is a position imposed on Ethiopia by force.
However, the EPRDF and EPLF position is a well orchestrated one and they are not as such foolish to submit the case to the International Court of Justice. What they decided themselves and for which they fought should not be left to a neutral court. They had to make it sure that nothing should be decided outside what they always fought for. Namely the Ethiopian colonisation of Eritrea and the recognition of Eritrean territory in accordance with selectively chosen defunct and illegal colonial treaties which served to Italy as title deed on Ethiopian territory. To this end, the an arbitration tribunal was the best one even compared to mediation. Because in the case of mediation, it would be politically embarrassing for the Ethiopian government to agree to the cession of Ethiopian territory. However it has used the arbitration tribunal as a pretext to say to the Ethiopian people that it cannot do anything other than to abide by the "award of a neutral arbitration tribunal". In fact it is the Ethiopian government which has decided the cession of Ethiopian territories by agreeing to submit the case to an arbitration commission. Because, the commission's work is limited to implementing the provisions of the Algiers Agreement. The Hague based border commission is not therefore neutral contrary to what the EPRDF wants us to believe. It is a commission which is expected to give a decision in accordance with the Algiers Agreement. But we know that the Algiers Agreement is an anti Ethiopian agreement aimed at favouring Eritrea at the expense of Ethiopia's independence and national sovereignty. One could have spoken of neutral body if only that body had the jurisdiction to determine all relevant rules of international law. In the absence of such a possibility, it is a propaganda ploy to try present the border commission as a neutral body. Explaining why disputing states decide to choose an arbitration Hazel Fow writes:
"The primary attraction of arbitration as a method for the settlement of boundary disputes has always been the high degree of control over the proceedings which the method permits the states - the parties to the dispute in arbitration - to exercise. True, they surrender their independent action by agreeing in advance to accept the award of arbitrator as binding, and in general (save where exceptional power is granted to decide ex aequo et bono) submit the dispute to be judged by standards of international law and national interest" (Arbitration, in The International Regulations of Frontier Disputes, ibid., P. 170).One should bear in mind that when the arbitration commission decides the case in accordance with international law, it is not every relevant international law which is applicable. It is the international law which the parties have restrictively chosen. In the case of the Hague Border commission, no international law is applied. Because the Algiers Agreement is not based on international law. In fact the substance of the Algiers Agreement is in stark contradiction with international law. The Algiers Agreement says colonial treaties will be the basis of the demarcation. But that is not based international law. Because there is no international law which says that colonial treaties should be applicable in the case of border dispute. In the African case, the relevant legal regime is the Cairo resolution of 1964. And this resolution does not say at all that colonial treaties should be the basis of border demarcation. It says only the border that was inherited from a colonial power at the time of independence should be respected. This was also the case of Latin America which is the cradle of the principle of uti possidetis.In other words, reference to colonial treaties emanates from the personal preference of EPRDF leader to make Ethiopia a landlocked country so that she would be dependent on Eritrea. Behind the reference to colonial treaties is therefore a conspiracy to support Eritrea's economy at the expense of Ethiopia. However, an arbitration can also be used even when governments do act in the best interest of their countries. One may ask why:
Because, as Hazel Fox writes, "... in the choice of the person of the arbitrator and in the selection of the terms of reference, and in the detail provisions relating to the conduct of proceedings the parties retain a considerable control over the procedure. By a narrow definition of the areas to be determined, states may prevent from a general inquiry into the validity of frontier line. The definition of the issue is important politically, in that it reflects some approximation of the parties' views, but more so legally, in that it confers jurisdiction upon arbitration". (Ibid., P. 170-171).From this , one can argue that states can agree to narrow the definition of the legal issue because the issue is not so important (as in the case of the Hanish islands between the Yemen and Eritrea in which case they stated that the historical relationship between the Eritrean and Yemenite peoples were so important as to be damaged by the question of ownership of an island. The fact that the arbitration tribunal made repeated references to the Eritreao-Yemenite relationship showed that the parties valued more their relationship than the outcome of the arbitration award). Continue
[Opinions in this article are solely that of the writer.]