Reflections On An Aspect Of The Boundary Commission's Decision:
The Revision Of Ethiopian History To Perpetuate Past Colonialist AgendaBy: Efrem Yemane-Brehan, J.S.D
Background
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (the "Commission") is an arbitration panel created following agreement between the regime of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front ("EPLF") in Eritrea and the regime of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front ("EPRDF") in Ethiopia in Algiers in December 2000. The two one-time rebel groups were comrades in arms, but following fallout in their relationships, they fought a bitter conflict for a period of two years between 1998 and 2000. The Commission was sponsored by the United Nations and was put together by the two regimes in accordance with the Algiers Peace Agreement. Each regime selected two arbitrators and the four then selected the fifth one. The Commission delivered its Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on April 13, 2002.
The Commission's Mandate and Why Such Proved Disadvantageous to Ethiopia
Having been constituted by the two regimes, the Commission's mandate was limited from the very beginning. The Commission never was given an independent mandate. Its mandate was to decide only on the issues initially presented to it by the parties and based on the submissions and arguments made before it. The weaknesses and strengths of the disputing parties' submissions and arguments were evidently reflected in the Commission's logic, analysis, and final awards. Furthermore, the scope of the Commission's mandate was so limited that even more reliable, plausible, and authoritative external factors and alternatives had to be set aside in the making of final awards in order to meet the parties' preferences. This state of affairs has proved to be detrimental to Ethiopia.
First of all, despite the fact that the EPLF regime and the EPRDF regime fought a bitter war, they were comrades in arms for two decades before both seized power, one in Addis Ababa and the other in Asmara. The impact of that earlier camaraderie was ostensibly obvious in the positions the now-contending two parties advanced before the Commission. The two regimes were ideological allies for a very long time. Neither has shed a mutually shared ideology regarding Ethiopia's historical border, Ethiopia's important historical figures, the commitment to abide by the secret agreements the two regimes entered into following their seizure of power in the two capitals, and the independence of Eritrea.
Thus, for example, both regimes believe that Ethiopia does not have a historical claim over the Red Sea coast. Each shares with the other the view that Ethiopia never had a footing in the territory now called Eritrea before the 1952 UN resolution federating Eritrea with Ethiopia. Both regimes have a strong dislike for Emperor Menelik, since both subscribe to the view that Menelik blocked the continuation of Tigrean (and for current day Eritreans a possible Hamasien) hegemony over the rest of Ethiopia following the death of Emperor Yohannes. Both despise the Amhara ethnic group, whom they believe to be the main stumbling block against a Tigrean-speaking ethnic hegemony over the rest of Ethiopia, particularly because the Amharic language has been adopted as the lingua franca in Ethiopia. The two share exactly the same ideology as to the political, economic, social, cultural, and ethnic makeup of Ethiopia. They fought against Ethiopia together - the EPLF, to secede from, and the EPRDF, initially to secede from, but later, to seize power and impose Tigrean ethnic minority hegemony over the rest of the country after facilitating the Eritrean secessionist agenda. Both Meles and Isaias share the distorted version of history that claims that Ethiopian history is only 100 years old.
Finally, the two regimes had entered into several secret and some not so secret deals regarding border arrangements after their seizure of power. It can fairly be assumed that these deals were meant to benefit the EPLF, which was the senior and more powerful partner in the arrangement at the time. The EPRDF regime has never brought these agreements to the attention of the Ethiopian people to date, although their onerous impact was recently felt. This happened when, for example, the Commission decided to divide the town of Burre into two, despite Burre's location well beyond the 60-kilometer "border" that the EPRDF-exhumed 1908 treaty outlined as the border between Ethiopia and the Italian occupying forces along the Red Sea coast.
There are several actions and positions taken by the Meles regime before and during the war and later in his repeated and spirited pronouncements on the Assab and other issues that have convinced even reasonable minds that Meles in fact has a soft heart for Eritrea. Thus, while Eritrea was represented before the Commission by a regime that entertains to this day A deep hatred towards Ethiopia, Ethiopia, on the other hand, was represented by a regime with questionable commitment and allegiance to Ethiopia's national interest. Has any one heard of a "leader" of a country that shouts above everyone else that his country is not entitled to a port even after advice to the contrary by seasoned international diplomats? Has there ever been witnessed a "leader" who vehemently argues similarly like Meles Zenawi who says that a country of 65 million should remain landlocked by a small country of three million in the face of so much geopolitical, economic, and historical support to favor the former? Imagine a country only 60 kilometers away from the sea east west but its border running parallel for some 500 kilometers north south, and its own leader says those who demand access to the sea anywhere across the 60-kilometeer line are "war mongers"? Whatever cover up the EPRDF regime would like to give its treasonous commitment, the implications of the various positions adopted by this regime are patently clear to Ethiopians. It is out there for all to see that the "emperor is indeed naked."
Arguments Before the Commission - EPRDF's Abdication of Leadership Par Excellence. Can the Commission Escape Blame?
While we do not know the contents of the parties' submissions, since the Commissions deliberations are closed to the public and the briefs and transcripts of actual Commission proceedings have not been made available to public scrutiny to date, it was clearly evident that Ethiopia was extremely poorly represented. The decision was a monumental example of an abdication of responsibility by the EPRDF regime reinforcing the widely held assumption that the current regime in Ethiopia does not have Ethiopia's interests at heart. The Commission at times went out of its way to meet EPLF demands even in the face of evidence pointing to the contrary. The EPRDF representatives before the Commission made "admissions" against Ethiopian interests, failed to make arguments pertinent to Ethiopia, or altogether were silent in the face of unjustified EPLF demands. The Commission also went out of its way to accept EPLF demands by making opinions not sufficiently grounded in evidence or supported by authority.
Assab To start with, the regime's decision not to insist on putting Ethiopia's legitimate claims over the port of Assab as one of the agenda items for decision by arbitration at the Algiers' peace conference is inexcusable. Also inexcusable is its reluctance to make a separate declaration that the current border commission cannot definitively decide the issue of Assab.
The defunct treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908 Again the EPRDF regime's decision to bring from the dead the treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908 is beyond comprehension. First of all these treaties are unequal arrangements forced upon Ethiopia by colonial. These treaties were also later made null and void through Italian invasion of Ethiopia and again through Ethiopia's declaration of their nullity in 1952. EPRDF's insistence to exhume these null and void treaties is clear indication of a regime determined to hurt Ethiopia permanently. The Commission is not going to escape criticism on this. The Commission's unquestioning reliance on already defunct treaties could put the whole decision into question. It will very likely provide grounds for a review of the decision when a new regime denounces it as a decision based on invalidated treaties.
Tserona and Fort Cardona The current Ethiopian regime's declaration against Ethiopian interest, which the Commission called it an "admission" by opposing party, that Tserona and Fort Cardona are and have always been Eritrean, despite all maps showing otherwise, is a clear example of a treasonous enterprise in representing Ethiopia. Based on this "admission," the Commission awarded the two areas to Eritrea. It is an open secret that the Meles regime is an unpopular and undemocratic regime. It is also evident that this decision affects the future of two states. In recognition of these, the Commission should have opted to base its award on more plausible grounds than on the clumsy "admission by a party opponent" rule of evidence, a rule fit for application only to disputes between individuals.
Adopting April 27, 1993 as cut-off date The Meles regime's apparent commitment to protect EPLF's gains, achieved immediately after Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia, is also evident from the Commission's remark in section 3.36 that "the parties have . . . accepted that the date as at which the borders between them are to be determined is that of the date of the independence of Eritrea, that is to say, April 27, 1993." The impact of this "acceptance" is that EPLF, having been the senior partner in the overthrow of the regime of Mengistu Hailemariam, was allowed by Meles to maintain advantages accorded to it at a time it was able to dictate its terms against the junior partner, EPRDF.
Abandonement of the Coastline of Islands Concept Again, EPRDF's "abandon[ment]" of the "coastline of islands" concept (see § 6.19), an argument that could have opened the possibility of Ethiopia at least partly winning on her legitimate claims over access to the sea, and adoption of the EPLF's "coastline of the continent" concept, has damaged Ethiopian interests considerably. It is not uncommon for nations to accede to a strip of land to secure direct access to the sea (a case in point, Congo through Angola). South Africa still has a recognized right over Walvik Bay in Namibia. Britain's fights to hold on to the Falklands (Islas de Malvinas) or its control over Gibraltar are legendary. But Meles, through his representatives, abandons the most legitimate claims even by his own botched standards. Meles is for sure determined to keep Ethiopia landlocked. All his boastful defense about protecting a non-existent international "rule of law," even when international law itself offers legitimate leeway, is a sure sign of an Ethiopian regime with an agenda separate and apart from an Ethiopian agenda.
The Flimsy Defense to the Bada Claim An examination of sections 6.23 and 6.30 of the Commission's decision shows the relentless strategies adopted by the EPLF to place its claims well beyond the 60 kilometers line and Ethiopia's lukewarm argument in protest and counter-argument. Thus, in response to Eritrean claims of more frequent and concerted Italian presence in the Bada region, this was how the Ethiopian representatives responded: "[T]he Bada region is large and its extent is not clearly defined. Some parts of Bada are plainly Ethiopian and some parts are plainly Eritrean." Such a short answer, in the face of a barrage of counter-arguments by the EPLE, resulted in awards favorable to EPLF, and is an example of the kind of weak and clumsy legal defense that characterizes the Ethiopian side.
The surrender of half of the town of Burre and its surroundings to Eritrea Sections 6.30 and 6.32 of the Commission's decision actually give support to the above suspicion. The Commission there adopted, in the face of complete silence from the Ethiopian regime's representatives, the position forwarded by the EPLF. Even the invalidated but now resurrected 1908 treaty set 60 kilometers of distance from the coastline as the border line. Ethiopia was also victorious over the Eritrean invading forces in 2000, pushing them out of Burre. However, despite these, the Commission adopted Eritrean arguments that at Burre, which is well over 70 kilometers inland, Eritrea shared a checkpoint or customs facility with Ethiopia. The Commission noted that "[i]t is not unknown for States to locate a checkpoint or customs facility of one State within the territory of a neighboring State [and] [s]uch arrangements . . . do not necessarily involve a change of boundary." The Commission shifted gear, however, citing some report signed by the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes. That report indicated Burre to be the "border" (this memo also referred to Burre as "checkpoint"). The Commission also cited an Eritean memorandum "copied to the Ethiopian Embassy in Asmara" which reported of "Ethiopian trucks entering Eritrea through the checkpoints both in Zalambessa and Burre." On that basis, the Commission held that the case at Burre was a manifestation of a desire by both parties to make Burre the borderline.
The Commission was contradicting itself when it did not so divide Zalambessa, despite having in its hands an equal justification to do so based on this so called "memorandum," the same way it did with Burre. On the other hand, as usual acting against Ethiopia's interest, it refused to draw a line to award Ethiopia the east/west surroundings of Zalambessa thereby making this town jut into Eritrea, surrounded on all three fronts east/north/west by Eritrean territory. When it came to Burre, however, the Commission decided to divide not only the town of Burre into halve, but also to divide the surrounding area between points 39 to 40 north/south into half, giving Eritrea even more land than the invalid but EPRDF-exhumed 1908 treaty allowed. This is further evidence to the charge that the Commission was engaged in a non-mandated balancing act to fit a political agenda that the Ethiopian regime was perhaps hoodwinked not to believe existed. This Commission's award was thus not the result of legal reasoning based on available evidence as the Commission claimed it was guided by, but the result of political balancing beyond its mandate. The Ethiopian regime's representatives were no where to be seen arguing Ethiopian interest even with the availability of a mountain of evidence in their favor.
The above instances show the slant in the Commission's decision against Ethiopia due to the action or inaction of a treasonous leadership in Ethiopia, to relentless EPLF demands, and to a not-so-impartial tribunal's interpretation of facts and events in favor of the EPLF. One might perhaps be prompted not to put much blame on the Commission for this onerous decision on Ethiopia. After all, as the Ethiopian saying goes, "kebalebetu yaweke buda new" (meaning only the owner knows what is best for himself). If the Ethiopian regime is making declarations against its interest allowing the Commission to take such declarations as an "admission," if EPRDF is inadequately submitting supporting evidence, or the regime's representatives remain silent when they are supposed to aggressively defend Ethiopian interest, why should disinterested third parties like the Commission bother to contradict the Ethiopian regime?
DISTORTION OF THE HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA AND DEFAMING THE NAME OF MENELIK
Perhaps the worst damage that the decision inflicted on Ethiopia is its distortion of Ethiopian history. It is now agreed among Ethiopians that the Meles regime participated in the promotion of an Eritrean brand of the history of Ethiopia and the region, in effect claiming that Ethiopian history is only 100 years old. (See, e.g., Meles Zenawi, Eritrean People's Struggle From Where to Where (TPLF 1979) (Abraham Yayeh ed. 2000) (in Amharic). Perhaps, EPRDF's failure to aggressively submit supporting historical facts about Ethiopia, or the regime's acquiescence or active participation in the distortion of that history, is all but expected. However, the Commission has put its credibility and impartiality on the line when it adopted a version of history that was unsupported by independently verifiable historical facts and reliable authority. The record must be set straight.
The Pertinent Sections in the Commission's Decision
Two pertinent sections in the Commission's decision, quoted below, manifestly indicate that the Commission was engaged in the distortion of Ethiopian history and the history of one of her ablest leaders, Menelik. In so doing, it was adopting in toto Eritrean historical submissions that were apparently not challenged or very likely silently acquiesced to by the Ethiopian representatives. Sections 2.7 of the Commission's decision reads as follows:
Ethiopia has for long been an independent member of the international community. Apart from the period following its annexation by Italy in 1935 . . . , there has been no discontinuity or change in its status. The position of Eritrea is different. Prior to the 1880s, large parts of it had been subject to Ottoman and Egyptian authority. During that decade, Italy began to assert a colonial presence in the region, first at the Red Sea port of Assab and in 1885 at Massawa. Subsequent Italian attempts to expand its control inland were successfully resisted by Ethiopian forces. However, in 1889, by the Treaty of Uccialli, Ethiopia and Italy established the boundary between the Empire of Ethiopia and the areas of Eritrea then in Italian possession. On 1 January 1890, Italy formally established the Colony of Eritrea. In 1893, the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik denounced the Treaty of Uccialli, but Italian expansion inland continued until the battle of Adwa in 1896, in which Italian forces were defeated. A temporary boundary arrangement was then established between Ethiopia and Italy.
Again, section 4.7 of the Commission's decision reads in pertinent part as follows:Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia at first sought a frontier considerably to the north of the Mareb-Belesa-Muna line, but eventually agreed in 1900 to keep to that line (in exchange for a payment of 5,000,000 lire, apparently for forgoing a more extensive claim).I. The Commission's Reluctance To Acknowledge That Eritrea Or A Good Portion Of It Once Was Part Of Northern Ethiopia Is Telling
A close look at section 2.7 shows how much the Commission avoided acknowledging the well-documented and readily admitted historical fact that the territory now called Eritrea, with perhaps some variations to the north and west, was once part of Ethiopia. By taking such a position, the Commission was refusing to acknowledge that Ottoman Turkey and Egypt, and later the Italians, were encroaching upon Ethiopian territory. It was refusing to acknowledge that Ethiopia all throughout history never abandoned its legitimate claim over this territory, evidenced by (a) actual though intermittent, over-lordship of the Bahire Negash, (b) assertions of sovereignty through the diplomatic arena, through battles fought to restore sovereignty, and (c) through the perpetuation of sovereignty by securing allegiances of and enforcing payment of tributary duties on the local rulers.
The Commission gave prominence to dubious claims of control by outside forces, and dismissed in toto superior Ethiopian historical claims. In so doing, the Commission gave invaders from distant lands the benefit of the doubt over and above the unabated assertion and proven exercise of sovereignty by Ethiopia over the Red Sea coast over the centuries. A look at the history of the region proves the Commission otherwise.
A. Commission's Platitude About Ethiopia's Prominent Status In History
The Commission noted as follows:
Ethiopia has for long been an independent member of the international community. Apart from the period following its annexation by Italy in 1935, there has been no relevant discontinuity or change in its status.
This apparently benign statement hides the Commission's more subtle purpose of denying Ethiopian legitimate historical claims of territorial sovereignty over the area named Eritrea by the Italians. There have been several encroachments into Ethiopian territory over the centuries, especially in the northern parts of the country. It was not in 1935 only that Ethiopia's status changed, as the Commission appears to claim. When the Italians first came to Massawa and proceeded to establish a post in Assab and then made the whole of Ethiopia's northern territory into an Italian colony calling it Eritrea, Ethiopia's territorial status had changed. Going back further in history, when the Ottoman Turks and Egyptians came to the coastal region and at various times took control of the coastal region temporarily, Ethiopia's territorial status had changed. However, during all these times, Ethiopia never willingly accepted such arrangements, and never ceased fighting for the return of her territories illegitimately snatched from her by invaders. Even if Ethiopia was forced to enter into some unequal arrangements at various times to "stay alive," whenever the situation changed, Ethiopia re-asserted her claims and advanced to take back the territory she may have temporarily lost to these invaders.For one ignorant of Ethiopian history, the above quoted statement would create the wrong impression that Ethiopia has maintained the same status over the centuries, i.e., without a northern territory now called Eritrea including the Red Sea littoral. An advocate of the Commission's position might argue that this phrase was not intended to refer to changes in territory, but was only limited to the status of Ethiopia as a state in the international arena. But the Commission was capable of making its statement clear if it really intended that statement to mean so, thereby avoiding ambiguity. By implying that there were no colonial incursions that left Ethiopia dispossessed of any of its territory, except the 1935 Italian occupation, the Commission ignored Ethiopia's history of control of the Red Sea littoral for significant periods of time. The Commission's observations are, however, clearly in accord with EPLF and EPRDF version of history as clearly evidenced in Melez Zenawi's book. Hence, we need to reject the Commission's sinister platitude quoted above, and reply: "Thanks but no thanks."
B. Creating A New History For Eritrea
Once the Commission left the above implication in place, it proceeded to slant the history further against Ethiopia's interest. When it is well-known that there was no such territory called "Eritrea" prior to Italian formal declaration creating such in 1889, it sent the implication that there was one when the Commission observed: "Prior to the 1880s, large parts of it [Eritrea] had been subject to Ottoman and Egyptian authority." The Commission could have simply stated "large parts of the territory that forms current day Eritrea." The use of "it" may have been included to satisfy EPLF claims that Eritrea existed as an entity separate and apart from Ethiopia before the Italian colonization.
The sentence a few lines further reads strengthening the implication above: "However, in 1889, by the Treaty of Uccialli, Ethiopia and Italy established the boundary between the Empire of Ethiopia and the area of Eritrea then in Italian possession." Firstly, the Commission, by noting that the two sides "established" the boundary, was implying that, at the time, Ethiopia and Italy were equal partners engaged in a mutual, peaceful, and consensual endeavor of creating a legal entity. But this was not a reflection of the true state of affairs at the time. The Italians were continuously encroaching upon the sovereignty of a weaker nation, using all available pressure mechanisms, including military and diplomatic, and tactics, including disinformation, destabilization, and cajolery. They used all the connections and superior technology at their disposal at the time this stillborn "treaty" was signed. There is no better proof of this state of affairs than the fact that the "treaty" by which Ethiopia, together with Italy, "established" the boundary was immediately renounced by Ethiopia as having been the product of fraud and linguistic manipulation by Italy. The Commission, even more than a century after such arrangement of treachery was laid bare, cites it as support to prove that Ethiopia participated in the "establishment" of the border with Italy.
Furthermore, the Commission also selectively used language that would diminish Ethiopia's status by saying "between the Empire of Ethiopia and the area of Eritrea then in Italian possession." The fact of the matter was that Italy was carving out Ethiopian territory and creating an Italian colony called "Eritrea," a name referencing the Red Sea. If the Commission had not preferred to revise history in a manner detrimental to Ethiopia, it should only have said, if at all: "Italy, through the Treaty of Uccialli, attempted to establish the southern boundary of its newly created colony adjacent to the Red Sea which it later formally named the Colony of Eritrea. Ethiopia, however, immediately renounced this treaty as not binding. As a result, the treaty did not become effective." Better still though, the Commission should not have raised the treaty in a border arbitration in 2002 except as an anecdote in history to show Italian machinations at the time to gain a foothold in the region.
The Commission's toning down Ethiopian claims is another example of a less than impartial approach to settling the dispute. The Commission, rather than being specific as to which parts were in the hands of Ottoman or Egyptian control, simply uses the deliberately vague "large parts of" language. Does the Commission then tell us about what happens to the remaining part? No. We do not know what happens to the remaining part. It will not be an exaggeration to claim that the impression the Commission wanted to leave by this deafening silence as to the remaining part was that Ethiopia never had any sovereign territorial claim in any part of the territory now called Eritrea. The Commission deliberately ignored many known facts which prove that, compared to Ottoman/Egyptian claims, Ethiopia had a superior claim to the coastal region in general and the inland territory, especially the highland regions of current day Eritrea, in particular. The latter for all practical purposes were part of Tigre, a clearly Ethiopian territory, even well after the advent of Italy in Ethiopia's coastal regions of Assab and Massawa. Let us examine the historical facts.
1. History of the Region Before the 1880s
There are no disputes that the Port of Adulis on the Red Sea was an important port of ancient Ethiopia during the Axumite Kingdom and her sea routes were jealously guarded in those days by her kings. (Jean Doresse, Au Pays de la Reigne de Saba; l'Ethiopie Antique et Moderne17, 26, 28, 30 (1956).) Although the Turks claimed Massawa in 1557, this claim never remained unchallenged by Ethiopia. The Turks had to create an alliance with the Bahire Negash, the Ethiopian ruler of the sea coast and the adjacent highlands, but the Bahre Negash was brought to submission by the Ethiopian King Tsertsa Denghill (1563-1597). (David Buxton, Travels in Ethiopia 51 (1949).) After this reclaiming of the coastal region by Ethiopia, historical accounts of direct Ottoman rule of the coastal region were flimsy.
Like other states at the time, due to the absence of easy communication, ethnic and religious wars, the rise and fall of fortunes of Ethiopian kings, Ethiopian rulers may not have been in constant "control" over the coastal territory, especially as that term is understood nowadays. But Massawa was the main port for the transit of goods for Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian rulers on the highlands had to deal through peaceful and/or non-peaceful mechanisms to maintain, sometimes successful and other times not so successful, presence over the coastal region. We are not talking about a sea across seven mountains and rivers; we are talking about a short distance of couple of hundred kilometers even at its furthest. But even when Ethiopia did not have control due to invasion of her coastal territory by outside forces, she never ceased demanding the return of what was illegally taken from her. This was evident from the historical facts that during times of success the Ethiopian rulers were able to reassert their authority on the Red Sea coast and even to extend it to the Dahlak Islands and the distant port of Zeila on the Gulf of Aden. (Buxton at 43.)
The fact that the people in the coastal region converted to Islam, or the highland inhabitants continued to ascribe to a Coptic brand of Christianity, has evidently created difficulty for continued effective control of the coastal region by Ethiopian kings who often were Coptic. But one should not automatically assume that because Moslem Turkey and Egypt had an easier interaction with the local Moslem population, these areas were under Ottoman/Egyptian control in the period preceding the building of the Suez Canal. Actually what the Turks did in that period was to recognize the local chieftains of the Samahar, the lowland between the Ethiopian highlands in current day Eritrea and the port of Massawa, by bestowing on them the Moslem title Na'ib, and count them as allies.
Even at the best of times, Ottomon control in that region was limited to Massawa and some islands on the Red Sea. Turkish claims over the coast of Ethiopia and as far as Cape Guradafi were "dubious." (2 Mordechai Abir, Ethiopia: the era of the princes; the challenge of Islam and re-unification of the Christian Empire, 1769-1855 at xxi (1968)). The Red Sea trade declined due to the wars within Ethiopia during the Era of the Princes. Consequently, Ottoman authority in this coastal region in the second half of the eighteenth century had already dwindled so much that the whole coastal region was left "altogether to local rulers." (Id.)
For James Bruce who visited the region in 1769, the Na'ib was the de facto ruler, and outsiders paid monthly fees to the ruler for use of the coastal region. (Id. at 6.) During the time that the coastal region was in the hands of local rulers, granted that these coastal inhabitants were Moslem, the local leaders of this territory were given the Moslem title Na'ib, and these local rulers were generally recognized as rulers of the coastal region. However, and most importantly, during those times, the Na'ibs along the region of the Samahar also recognized the over-lordship of the rulers of Tigre. The Na'ibs knew that Massawa's fate rose and fell with the fate of the highland region and one can fairly assume that they were cognizant of this fact and its consequences and would have conducted themselves in a manner befitting the circumstances, especially knowing the proximity of the highland rulers. A letter sent by British Consul Plowden in 1849 to Palmerston from Adowa in 1849 clearly put the state of affairs at the time when the Ottomans had asserted some presence at the Ethiopian Red Sea coast:
(Abir at 135.) Thus, Dejazmach Wubie never stopped descending on Massawa to request tribute from the Na'ib there before Egyptian arrival in the coastal regions. Once Egyptian forces established posts on this Ethiopian soil in the 1860s, Dejazmach Wubie continued his campaign for Ethiopian control of the coastal region and never gave up his efforts for several years afterwards. (Id.) Even after he was overpowered by Turkish/Egyptian colonialist pursuit, he never left the invaders at peace by creating an atmosphere of perpetual threat of raids and attacks by the army of Ethiopia. (Id.)
The forces of Djaj Oobeay [Dejazmach Wubie, then ruler of Tigre] have made a descent upon the coast, declaring that the Turkish troops, by occupying the mainland, had trespassed upon the ancient dominions of Abyssinia, and had, by crushing the Na'ib, prevented the chief from paying to Oobeay his accustomed tribute.The recognition of mutual dependence was not one-sided either. The rulers of Tigre, confident of their grip over the coastal region through their over-lordship on the Na'ibs were willing to recognize that the Na'ibs' authority also extended to some parts of Hamasien, a highland and clearly undisputed area of Ethiopia, now within current day Eritrea. (Abir at 5 ( citing G. Lejean, Voyage en Abyssinie (1868); J.S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (1965); E. Ruppelle, Reise in Abyssinien (vol. I) (1838); E. Combes & M. Tamisier, Voyage en Abyssinie (vol. I) (1838).)
Egyptian presence in the Ethiopian coastal region was also so negligible as not to deserve such a mention in a boundary decision affecting Ethiopia. It unfortunately only gives some support to an agenda of interference in the affairs of the region by the Egyptians ever ready to see a weak, divided, and disrupted Ethiopia. By so including Egypt as a past "sovereign" over the northern Ethiopian territories, the Commission has, knowingly or unknowingly, given a green light for Egyptian ever-present desire to influence events in the horn region. Besides, the Commission has, by so doing, also lent support to EPLF's likely desire for Egyptian protection or alliance in the future in case Ethiopia reasserts her rightful claims, especially the restoration of her Red Sea coast. It is troubling to see the Commission giving prominence to a historically dependent power like Egypt, first on the Ottomans and later on Britain, which even at the best of times was only serving as an agent of these other forces. This action by the Commission only adds more fuel to an existing tension, often brought about by Egyptian muscle flexing, motivated by a desire to unilaterally impose an unfair and inequitable use of the Nile waters on riparian states. A Commission supposedly created to bring peace is here seen recklessly endangering it by extending "authoritative" recognition of colonial dominion to a small and dependent colonial power with dubious historical claims of control in the region.
Egyptian presence in Massawa before the advent of the Suez Canal was minimal. It was in the late 1840s that Egypt began to assert a presence as successor to Ottoman rule in the region and this action was mainly influenced by its being privy then to the European colonial concepts of how a nation can assert "effective control" over a distant colonial territory. The following apt observation clearly underscores the Ethiopian conception versus the European conception (which the Egyptians very likely took into account in making their assertions on Ethiopia's coastal territory):
Ethiopian notions of borders and of the delimitation of areas in the nineteenth century were very different from those of the Egyptians, who were already influenced by European thought. . . . Even the areas stretching as far as the lowlands and the plains of the Sudan, which were not under direct rule of the Ethiopian lords, were still considered as belonging to Ethiopia. They would be penetrated from time to time when a provincial governor could disengage himself from the unceasing struggle for power, and the inhabitants would be forced to pay tribute. Thus, the [several inhabitants, nomadic or semi-nomadic of Northern Ethiopia which now constitute Eritrea] were considered by different Ethiopian rulers as their subjects although an Ethiopian [administratior] might not have been seen within those areas for decades.
(Abir at 116-17.) If Ethiopia were privy to the European doctrine of effective control, she could very likely have done the way the Egyptians intentionally did, especially during initial Egyptian encroachments. But for the Europeans, and Egypt for that matter, enforcing the "effective control" doctrine was necessary, however unfair it was to small nations like Ethiopia. This was because Europeans and the Ottomans, and later Egypt as their agent, came crossing high seas, deserts, and mountains in order to assert control over foreign lands that are not contiguous, i.e., physically detached from the metropolis. That was not the case for Ethiopia. Descending the highland just for a hundred kilometer or so would bring the Ethiopian kings into the coastal region or going for less than a couple of hundred kilometers to the west and north would bring them to the lowlands.Why would an Ethiopian sovereign think that a land adjacent and proximate could be considered a foreign territory as long as the local rulers of that adjacent land pay tribute and declare their allegiance? After all is not this doctrine designed only for colonial seizure of distant lands? Does it really matter that the Ethiopian ruler perhaps only showed up to demand such tribute and allegiance only after a decade or so? Why should the classic doctrine of sovereignty over contiguous regions through assurances of allegiance and payment of tributes by the local sovereign be disregarded when it concerns Ethiopia, and a colonial doctrine of conquest be applied to her disadvantage? After all, is not this ancient doctrine which created the basis of state formation in Europe and other places since time immemorial? It is only the obfuscation of these two completely separate doctrines that could lead one to totally ignore Ethiopian past sovereignty altogether over the territory now called Eritrea but give prominence and recognition to Ottoman/Egyptian and later Italian sovereignty instead.
The garrison established in Massawa by the Ottomans/Egyptians during 1847-1848 was no larger than one battalion. (Abir at 136.) Ethiopia was at the time busy under Emperor Theodros creating a unified state and the implications of this Egyptian strategy was as yet not on the Ethiopian high list of priorities. The Egyptians were also doing what they were doing not by force as to attract any attention by the local rulers or Ethiopia but only peacefully. (Id.) Actual Egyptian assertion of authority did not occur until 1866 perhaps due to the urgency for such control as the Suez Canal was soon to open in 1869.
The Egyptians began to consolidate their hold on Massawa only after the British left from Magdala. (Darrell Bates, The Abyssinian Difficulty 218 (1979).) Following the death of Theodros and the emergence of Yohannes as the strongman, the Egyptians took advantage of the internal disorder and invaded Ethiopia from Zeila under the Swiss-Egyptian, Munzinger Pasha, who was defeated by Yohannes. By the time Yohannes was in control of the internal situation, Ethiopia's Red Sea territories had been snatched from her, with Italy in Assab, France in Obock (Djibuti), and Britain in Zeila. (A.B. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia 23-28 (1901); Ernest Work, Ethiopia: A Pawn in European Diplomacy 56-58 (1931).) Compare this historical fact with the Commission's statement that "[p]rior to the 1880s, large parts of [the territory that now forms Eritrea] had been subject to Ottoman and Egyptian authority," as if these nations had been there for a millennia, when in fact Ottoman presence in earlier times was only "dubious," and Egyptian's may only have been effectively there for no more than fourteen years and even then were being menaced by Yohannes all the time, between 1866 and 1880.
By 1880, with Egypt having fallen under British protectorate, British diplomats were determined to restore Ethiopian sovereignty over the coastal region. British military attaché Sir Charles Wilson advocated return of some territory to Ethiopia. A British officer, Colonel J.D. Stewart pressed that at least some coastal region south of Massawa be returned to Ethiopia. Another officer, Capitain Speedy, writing to Lord Napier, suggested that the port of Zula and a strip of territory be ceded to Ethiopia, but Lord Napier, in reply, advocated the return of Massawa to Yohannes, considering this act as "recovering the territory wrestled from him [Yohannes]." (See generally Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, Yohanes IV of Ethiopia: a political biography 122-27 (1975).) Unfortunately, this attempt by the British diplomatic and military establishment failed to materialize since Italy began to strengthen the foothold it got in the region through cajolery and gunboat diplomacy. The British did not aggressively pursue an Ethiopian cause thereby displeasing the Italians, an European power, again leaving Ethiopia as the pawn in international diplomacy.
Our learned Commission, unfortunately, continues to extend to Egypt even today historical recognition as past sovereign but ignore Ethiopia's proven sovereignty over the region. Thus, the above-discussion has shown that there was no sufficient basis for the respectable Commission to make a sweeping statement like "large parts of [the territory that now forms Eritrea] had been subject to Ottoman and Egyptian authority." Thus, in the face of so much historical evidence, even assuming there is some doubt as to Ethiopia's continued "control" over the coastal region, why should Ethiopia be denied the benefit of the doubt while even dubious assertions of "control" by Ottoman Turkey are given more prominence? Why should a dwindling Ottoman power be given the benefit of the doubt, despite a "more logical" interpretation of historical and geographic facts that would normally dictate interpretation in Ethiopia's favor?
No ancient state on earth this proximate to the sea has ever been subjected to a systematic distortion and revision of its history just to deny it of its natural access to the sea, except Ethiopia, which the Commission half-heartedly recognized as "for long an independent member of the international community." Think of any ancient nation and there is none. This predominantly negative outlook towards non-European kingdoms and the general disdain of Europeans towards these nations could only explain this biased approach to history. It is sad to see that such disdain towards Ethiopian control continues to be entertained even to this day, albeit now with the use of manipulative platitudes, and unfortunately, with a mendacious agenda to revise history, and the blessing of an acquiescent leadership in Ethiopia. NEXT
[Opinions in this article are solely that of the writer.]