Doing Nothing will be a Strategic Error 

By: Medhane Tadesse

(The Sub-Saharan Informer)

I read the latest position of the European Union on the situation in Somalia with a great deal of amusement and despair. The International Crisis Group has come up with a similar report, opposing any peacekeeping intervention in Somalia and calling for dialogue. Sure, both reports are concerned with the deteriorating situation in Somalia and worried that any military support to the Transitional Federal Government /TFG/ would increase the level of violence in the region. Fair enough. It is always tempting to call for dialogue and say that it is still possible. But, what are the facts. By any reasonable standard the Khartoum talks were never serious. The leadership of the Consultative Council of Islamic Courts/CCIC/ declined to join in serious talks because they believed that the prospects of finishing the TFG militarily is much higher than achieving the same through a protracted and lengthy peace negotiations. A complicating factor is the venue of the talks. Arab League diplomacy is improperly astounding. The CCIC has kept the rumor of negotiations going, playing along with the most manipulative aspects of Eritrea-handled issues and the game of the Arab League/AL/.

The handling of Khartoum ‘talks' by the AL played directly into the hands of the CCIC core in Mogadishu, which keeps using the timeline of talks to continue the war against the TFG. At various times it was indicated that the UN, AU or IGAD lead the negotiations in Khartoum-which is not the right place for such a talk. But both the CCIC and its closest funders were opposed. With few friends and either bad or cool relations with most neighboring African countries, the AU, US, EU, or the UN, the CCIC had little to loose by marginalizing these powerful forces, and much prestige to gain among its close supporters. And given hostile attitude towards IGAD, any sort of multilateral and African organization by the CCIC and Asmara, IGAD could not assume the role.

The CCIC and its supporters favored the Arab league, leading the process, but it did not have both the experience and neutrality. The TFG accepted it reluctantly. Almost TFG acceptance was mainly due to lack of other choices, but partly based on the view that the CCIC is largely under the strong influence of the ‘facilitators' and that no agreement could be reached with out their consent.
Both Eritrea, Egypt, Sudan or the Arab league share the view of the CCIC in limiting the involvement of front line African states, the UN, the US and its allies in Somalia. The TFG probably also anticipated that a successful outcome to negotiations would serve to reduce some of the international pressure and widespread criticism over the failure to reach out other Somali forces, formerly Mogadishu warlords and now the CCIC. Against this background the TFG accepted the handling of the talks by the AL to use its good offices to help ease tensions with its rivals. But Khartoum plays along with Eritrea and its complacency against the TFG has been such that the TFG was left in the cold and has had to lie low during and leave the talks because of the bad faith of Arab league mediators.

Although the TFG and IGAD member states were skeptical of the intentions of the leading members of the Arab League they understood that there was no escaping its overtures in ‘deal making' or as it practically turned out to be deal breaking. And with the loss of its allies and support from the international community and less than impressive military posture- remember the TFG is basically a political institution and not a military structure - it had largely run out of options. Conversely, the anti-TFG coalition is likely to be so dependent on the AL and its regional allies allies; its preponderant role in Somalia would dramatically reduce Africa's influence in Somalia's national politics. Clearly, the CCIC's success left the frontline African powers at a loss and provided an opening for the AL to broker the talks in Khartoum. African states were constrained to acquiesce in the Khartoum process, but they continued with their plans for a peacekeeping mission that has been resolutely opposed by the CCIC, receives no support from the AL and now being opposed- strangely- by the EU.

The TFG is a legitimate government created through a legitimate political process; both the Somali way and the globally accepted standards. Its parliamentary body was created based on purely clan representation while the top executive organ was elected through an open and free presidential race. The TFG is as legitimate as much as it can. No body disputes that. Then the question would be how far could the international community go to help such a government? Is it normal to support a legitimate government against internal enemies or non-state actors? What is the experience in Africa and elsewhere? Is it normal to ask permission to rebels or non-state actors to help a democratically elected government protect itself from destabilization? The experience in other regions, for instance, Sierra Leone shows otherwise. Irrespective of the opposition, in fact antagonism from the rebel leaders from both Fodday Sankoh and later Major Koroma, leading African governments with the help of some elite forces from Western powers intervened to reinstate and save what they called as a legitimate government.

Whatever its limitations in terms of political leadership and military prowess, any legitimate government deserves some form of support from the international community. The major power blocks in the international community sort of half way admit this fact: that the TFG is indeed a legitimate government and thus need to be supported. Then they fail short of taking practical measures to that effect. Had the TFG been provided with the necessary support early last year the international community should not have been in this hopeless situation in the first place? The TFG was ignored. Infact, the international community had, knowingly or unknowingly starved it. Now the TFG is caught by its throat, the last thing it needs at this point is another failure from the international community, particularly the EU that invested a lot to initiate the legitimate political process and keep the political transition going. The concern now should be how to salvage the political transition in Somalia.
Faced with the failure of the TFG, the continued momentum of the CCIC and the looming possibility of open warfare, the EU seems to be at a loss and clearly constrained to position itself to help in containing the conflict. The EU should seriously look at the ramifications of its recent statement. As the African block pursues peacekeeping mission, Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti closed ranks. This is an extension of the August 28 cooperation agreement signed between the ruling parties in Asmara and Khartoum aimed at “frustrating evil schemes imposed by international powers” and preventing “foreign intervention in Sudanese and Somali issues. Bad precedence. Opposing peacekeeping has almost become a fashion and unless challenged head on, it will spread.

The argument of the EU and Brussels-based think thanks is also based on the erroneous assumption that dialogue is possible. Hoping that there will be dialogue is one thing. Preparing the ground for dialogue is quite another. However unfortunate it seems, the only requirement for serious political dialogue in Somalia is to arrest the destabilizing momentum of the CCIC. At the very least the EU should make it clear that it is worried and alarmed by the CCIC's ever more extreme and reckless inclination to pursue a violent confrontation to achieve its goals. Most important, the international community should pass a clear message to the leaders of the organization that it is not easy to push their way militarily and destabilize peaceful zones in Somalia. Without such affirmation, the hardliners in the CCIC will not be induced or compelled to seek a negotiated settlement. The international community should be specifically concerned on how to create conditions conducive to constructive dialogue in Somalia. One way of doing that is to work on the modalities of supporting a peacekeeping force. It is wise to remember that the check on the CCIC's territorial advances last august drove the two sides back to the table.

You cannot have a policy of doing nothing and opposing the only available option for fear of being disadvantaged by the outcome. This will be a strategic failure. Such a position would only help in tipping the balance of power in Somalia in favor of the CCIC. To recognize this reality doesn't mean that there is no hope of political reconciliation for the years to come. There is. But hope is not a policy.
The best way to approach the Somali situation is not to just oppose any external engagement but to make it serve the purpose of political transition. For that to happen, the violent expansion of the CCIC must be stopped. It will be difficult, if not impossible to expect serious interest for dialogue from a group riding high, believing its revolutionary momentum could not be arrested and thinks that it has both the means and the mission to expand? The actions of the militants in the past three months and their behavior and indefinite listing of difficult preconditions in the talks have only guaranteed escalating hostilities. The external players that may be in the best position to have a moderating influence on the group are those that are pushing and supporting the CCIC for a military solution. What is obvious is that a peace negotiation, let alone a peace deal, does not seem to be achievable in the short term. Just keep in mind that serious negotiations requires 1) some kind of focused Ad Hoc multilateral intervention and 2) a change in the venue and composition of the mediators.