* This paper was written a year ago, and given important developments throughout the year 2007 including the release of CUDP leaders from prison, you may find some of the information outdated. Yet, the important aspects of the paper remain relevant.  Feedback: gmequanent@rogers.com

 

Abstract

 

Although many countries have been able to stage successful national elections, the outcomes have not brought about significant effects on democratization processes.  The Ethiopian experience suggests that elections in their own cannot promote democratization unless accompanied by complementary conditions including conductive political environments, growth of strong political parties and mutual confidence in electoral institutions. This article thus discusses the process and outcome of the 2005 Ethiopian election to identify the challenges and opportunities that were inherent in the electoral process including an assessment of the participation of political parties.

 

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1. Introduction

The 2005 Freedom House Survey found that 89 countries were “free”, 48 countries “partially free” and 45 countries “not free”. The survey used a seven-point scale rating system to assess the record of countries in respecting political rights and civil liberties.  Of course, we can debate about how this normative method is defined and broadly applied to measure the state of democracy around the world. The April 2002 issue of Journal of Democracy has as a theme “election without democracy” where Larry Diamond, Adreas Schedler, Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way and Nicolas van de Walle present discussions of different types of democratic regimes.[1] Marina Ottaway also argues that, in spite of decades of democracy promotion efforts, there has been an increasing number of governments that cannot be identified as “democratic”; they are what she calls semi-authoritarian regimes.[2] These and other scholars help us understand the complex task of determining what can and what cannot be considered an electoral democracy. But clearly, nowadays democracy has increasingly become a standard measure of a country’s level of development including “good governance” and equitable accesses to social, economic and cultural opportunities in society.

The process of institutionalization of democratic norms, institutions and practices in society is called democratization. This concept evolved out of the political reform agenda of donor countries in the 1980s and it still remains central to their foreign aid policy and program initiatives. However, until recently, democratization initiatives were focused on supporting multiparty elections. Donor agencies often provided financial and technical support for developing countries to prepare and run national elections including dispatching election observers to monitor electoral processes. While a growing number of countries have been able to stage successful national elections, they remain confronted with enormous challenges of promoting electoral democracy. 

The historical and contemporary literature is full of analysis and explanation of the root causes of obstacles in this area of political development - democratisation.[3] For instance, the earlier, 1960s, period of the debate was mainly focused on the impact of colonialism. It was argued that newly independent nations had inherited not only artificial states prone to political instability, but they also adopted colonial institutions that embodied autocratic values. James Coleman and Carl Rosberg wrote that the new nation-states were comprised of “hundreds of heterogeneous ethnic communities and tribal societies arbitrarily bunched together within artificial boundaries” and that in “the absence of national cultural traditions, power within the new states has passed, by default, into the hands of the leaders of organized groups”.[4] As ethnicity and clientelism came to be more and more widely used by ruling elites to build the social bases of their political power, rational resource allocation mechanisms were destroyed.  This eventually gave rise to what Will Kymilcka calls “community of contenders” (ethnic groups) competing to get access to state resources.[5] Groups that lost out in these competitions rose to fight the system and so many countries were thrown into perpetual states of political crises and civil wars. Thus, Marina Ottaway writes “in many countries that have experienced a political transition since the early 1990s, unfavorable conditions – including weak democratic institutions and political organizations, persistent authoritarian traditions, major socioeconomic problems, and ethnic and religious conflicts – created formidable obstacles to the establishment and, above all, the consolidation of democracy”.[6]

National elections are the most important aspect of democratization in societies and political parties play important roles in the processes. For instance, parties recruit and orient individuals (politicians) so that they can articulate shared national goals or debate and transform societal ideals into clear political programs. Parties also assume “what is perhaps the most important strategic responsibility of modern democracy building: to prepare and select candidates for parliamentary and presidential elections and then to support them in positions of leadership and government when the implementation of democratic reforms takes place”.[7]  In spite of this, according to Peter Burnell, “there has been more interest in supporting elections and the development of civil society organizations, and this work has tended to overshadow the importance of political parties”. [8] In the absence of strong parties to support effective political and decision-making processes, developing countries remain faced with serious challenges of advancing sustainable development goals.  

The Ethiopian experience with the 2005 election contributes to an understanding of the challenges and opportunities that are inherent in the democratization process including the role that is played by political parties. With the exception of some logistical problems and reported incidents of intimidation of opposition supporters, the process of Ethiopian historic election – historic because it was the first ever competitive election - was free and fair. Opposition parties were provided with access to state-controlled and private media. Every adult population voted. International observers were allowed to observe the electoral process. The National Election Board of Ethiopian administered the election. But, there was one problem: opposition parties claimed that there had been massive election fraud and so they refused to accept the results. This culminated into a post-election political stalemate. It caused violent street protests and the death of 193 people; imprisonment of opposition politicians; polarization of Ethiopian society; donors withholding aid packages; tarnishing of the country’s international image; and so on. In seeking an explanation for this outcome, we focus our attention on the examination of issues such as the following: why did political parties fail to resolve the post-election crisis? What factors were important in influencing their behaviour and performance during the election? Did the parties possess adequate organizational capacity? Were they well organized and well prepared when they entered the 2005 election race? By addressing these and other issues, we will be able to understand the circumstances or situations under which all political parties participated in the 2005 election and assess to what extent their performance was affected by them. We hope to contribute to an understanding of the many-sided process of democratization and country- or context-specific issues relevant to the design of initiatives in this area of work.

The next section provides a brief conceptual framework for assessing the role of political parties in the democratization process and identifies factors that can possibly constraint or facilitate their performance. Space does not permit us to review a large body of historical and contemporary literature, and therefore, we will focus only on issues specific to the context of this article. Section three briefly describes the state of political parties in Ethiopia and proceeds to provide the details of the 2005 election and identify the lessons learned.  The last section makes concluding remarks.

2. Why Focus on Political Parties

The encyclopedia defines a political party as comprising  “a group of persons organized to acquire and exercise political power”.[9]  Political parties “connect leaders to followers and simplify political choices, framing them in terms of citizens’ own interests”.[10] They facilitate political brokerages or the aggregation of different interests to achieve political unity and inclusive policy agenda. More importantly, political parties impose discipline. Politicians would be required to respect the rule of law including transparency in the formulation of party policies; adherence to electoral procedures and processes; respect for the decisions of the majority (ruling) party; peaceful resolution of conflicts; and nurturing institutions of governance. These and other capacity requirements determine how politicians acquire and exercise political power in the interest of society.

Nonetheless, in developing countries, where multiparty politics is a recent phenomenon, political parties lack adequate capacity, such as internal democracy, inclusive decision-making structures, internal party rules, transparent accounting practices, open party conventions and strong representation of women and minority groups.[11] Yet, one should not generalize these capacity issues. For instance, in Ethiopia, 12 of the 17 political parties in the current parliament are ethnic-based parties, which can indicate an inclusion of different ethnic groups.[12] Women also occupy nearly half of the parliamentary seats for the ruling party. Nor do I wish to prescribe a capacity building strategy. In fact, there are various capacity building initiatives and approaches intended to improve the performance functions of parliaments and political parties.[13] The discussion in this article is concerned with sharing the Ethiopian experience with democratization in the context of the 2005 election. In order to provide some context for the proceeding discussion, the following two variables are considered: 1) political environment, and 2) internal capacity.   

Political environment. Most of the time the party in power takes charge of the preparation and staging of a national election. The political behaviour of the ruling party can therefore be an important factor in determining how opposition parties prepare for and participate in a national election. For example, the ruling party can consider peaceful dialogue to accommodate the demands of the opposition parties or insist that they comply with electoral rules and procedures developed without their input. The later approach often ends up frustrating opposition parties to the extent of compelling them to seek external intervention. When outsiders (usually Western donors) intervene, they end up playing a prominent role in the political process at the expense of the participation of citizens and civil society. 

Furthermore, once election is completed and parliament resumes, the ruling party (which has won a majority) can exercise leadership to facilitate the effective participation of opposition parties in decision-making processes or use its majority power to marginalize them. A ruling party that is committed to fostering democratic governance will adapt policies and practices that foster parliamentary democracy.

Internal capacity.  Too often the strength of a political party is measured by its policy orientation and quality of leadership. For instance, a party must develop a clear vision that helps to achieve the aggregation of different interests, thereby unifying all party members under a strong political program or election agenda. A party that has a strong leadership focuses on public policy issues rather than, for example, appealing to national, ethnic or religious sentiments to solicit political support. However, parties must also have organizational resources to function effectively. We provide the following online job poster for a political party staff in Britain as an example to illustrate this point.[14] The tasks are:

 “-recruiting, organising and motivating volunteers to assist in campaigns, publicity and fundraising;

-overseeing media relations - handling enquiries from the media and informing them of forthcoming activities and events;

-maintaining membership records, analysing the electoral roll, and dealing with other general administrative responsibilities;

-organising election campaigns and ensuring that they comply with electoral law;

-managing the local party's finances and raising funds;

-liaising between the local party and its MP/MEP (member of parliament)”.

The performance of these organizational functions by knowledgeable and motivated staff will enable a political party to develop good policies and enhance its outreaching capacity.

While a ruling party can have access to state resources, an opposition party often lack financial resources to retain personnel who work in its headquarters let alone in party branch offices in regional and dusty small towns across the country. Whereas parties in Western countries are supported by contributions from members and interest groups, party members in developing societies are poor and so they are unable to make financial contributions. Moreover, whereas interest groups in Western countries support political parties in anticipation of future benefits (if the party wins, it will develop policies in their favour), interest groups in developing societies are accustomed to bribing politicians and bureaucrats to protect their interests (they care less about supporting opposition parties). Unless opposition political parties have secured sources of finance, they cannot develop adequate organizational capacities essential for supporting their parliamentary and party functions.

In short, political parties that have strong organizational capacities facilitate inclusive political processes and articulate policies. In contrast, weak political parties will be unable to articulate clear policies and instead they may focus their attention on criticizing the ruling party. This irritates the ruling elites who can adapt political tactics that create obstacles for the election campaigns of opposition parties or limit their participation in decision-making processes. While our approach here may lack analytical or explanatory details, these variable (political environment and internal capacity) will be useful in helping us understand the 2005 Ethiopian election climate and how it affected the performance of parties and vice versa.

3. The May 2005 Election

In the past three decades, Ethiopia has experienced rapid political changes.  In 1974, the oldest monarchy in history (2,500 years old) was overthrown and replaced by a brutal military-socialist regime that ruled the country for 17 years. The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) toppled this regime in 1991 and created a federal state organized around ethnic-based regions. The federation consists of a federal state, regional states, Woredas (districts) and Kebeles (locals). The House of Peoples Representatives (with a five year term) is the highest authority in the federation and the party that has the majority of seats in this House forms the government. Regional States have State Councils and broad powers on matters falling under their jurisdiction. The Woredas have Councils directly elected by the local population and they are responsible for developing plans and administering social programs falling under their jurisdiction. Finally, the Kebele Administrations have their locally elected Councils and perform functions limited to overseeing small-scale development related activities.

There are now several studies on Ethiopian federalism.[15] A recent volume on this subject edited by David Turton argues that, while ethnic and linguistic groups have used the federal system to claim territorial autonomy, group identities and federal representation, neither regional states nor the federal state have been able to provide them with adequate support to build their capacities, such as active participation in political processes and resolving conflicts.[16] Furthermore, the functions of Ethiopian regional states are directed by the central party structure of the ruling party, EPRDF. Although this ensures the uniform implementation of legislative frameworks and policies, it may slow down the development of autonomous federal-regional relationships, which is essential for the building and strengthening of regional governance capacities.

In recent years, EPRDF has been feeling pressure to speed up the democratisation process of the Ethiopian political system. To be sure, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi became increasingly aware of this issue when he got involved in regional initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Commission for Africa –both committed to promoting democratic governance. As donor agencies like the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) increased their aid to Ethiopia, they also demanded to see results that demonstrate good governance. The Ethiopian people also got impatient with the slow pace of political changes. These and other factors had created an impetus for EPRDF to prepare an open and fair election in May 2005. Among the preparations were the strengthening of the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) and developing electoral rules and procedures. The NEBE web site provides a list of 12 electoral “legal frameworks” formulated since EPRDF came to power in 1991.[17] However, opposition parties had limited or no participation in the development of these frameworks and, as we will see later, they had no adequate confidence on the Ethiopian electoral system including the ability of NEBE itself to administer a national election. In this section, we describe the major political parties and then proceed to provide an account of the 2005 election and then identify the lessons learned.

Political Parties

            The current 526-seat parliament comprises of 17 political parties and one independent member.[18] Twelve of the parties are regional (ethnic-based) and the rest national (non-ethnic). Certainly one can interpret this number of political parties as the result of the policy of the ruling party which encourages political elites to organize around ethnicity or a reflection of the diversity of Ethiopian society.  Merera Gudina also points out that Ethiopian elites have failed to develop a collective vision and this has led to political fragmentation.[19]  Broader political development issues like these are the subject of comprehensive study and analysis. Our concern here is on political parties. To limit the scope of this article, we will only be concerned with the ruling party (EPRDF) and two major opposition parties: Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP) and United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF).

EPRDF. This party consists of the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM) and Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Movement (OPDM). EPRDF was formed in the mid-1980s. Other than the short-lived crisis within TPLF (in 2001), it is the most stable and experienced party in the country. The party also has resources. As a guerrilla organization, TPLF –the most influential and dominant party within EPRDF - had created enterprises that operated in neighbouring countries (e.g., a transportation business in Sudan using tracks captured on battle field in Northern Ethiopia). Such enterprises generated revenues and supported TPLF’s guerrilla operations. When EPRDF seized state power, some of these highly resilient enterprises quickly took roots in Ethiopian economy and flourished, although many people have speculated that they might have used their political connections to get access to government contracts. Regardless of this, they remain an important source of support for EPRDF.

Although EPRDF is comprised of ethnic political parties, it has deep roots in Ethiopian rural society, which is not surprising since the majority of EPRDF members are former guerrilla fighters who had lived with the peasantry for many years. When the party seized state power in 1991, it inherited a society whose economy and infrastructure was devastated by decades of civil war. Today EPRDF’s socio-economic policies receive positive reviews, even though their impacts on Ethiopian society are not clearly visible. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) report on the Ethiopian government’s national poverty reduction strategy identifies promising results.[20] The World Bank’s recent report ranks Ethiopia among the top African countries that have sustained an average economic growth rate of above 5% from 1996 to 2005.[21] The UK foreign aid policy paper cited the government’s rural safety-net program as a good example.[22]  The Ethiopian government has also partnered with the United Nations World Food Program and the World Bank to experiment an insurance system for rural farmers.[23] The expansion of infrastructure and public services to rural areas and development of mobile social service programs for the nomadic populations are other examples of promising poverty reduction initiatives. Nonetheless, many Ethiopians and international observers would agree that EPRDF could have been able to register more achievements if it had involved stakeholders in crucial decision-making and planning processes. Despite more than a decade of rhetoric of democracy, the ruling elites have not done enough to change the closed system of decision-making of the Ethiopian government. Opposition parties have always been frustrated for being relegated to “commenting” on reports and planning documents without having any say in the processes. For the first time the government presented a five-year (2006-2010) plan to parliament in May 2006, although opposition officials were not sure if their input would be considered in the finalization of the plan.[24]

Opposition parties. CUDP consists of the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP), United Ethiopian Democratic Party-Medhin (UEDP-Medhin) and Rambo and Ethiopian Democratic League. UEDF is a coalition of the Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Coalition (SEPDC), Oromo National Congress and other organizations including those in the Diaspora such as the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP). CUDP and UEDF were created a year or so prior to the 2005 election, even though their members had existed for years. These two coalition parties were created to form united political fronts against a powerful ruling party. They had no sufficient time to develop policies and political agenda that would serve as threads to bind coalition members together and, in fact, according to one observer, they wasted  “an entire year doing infighting rather than prepare for the election”.[25] In his prison memoir, Birhanu Nega (one of the jailed CUDP leaders) revealed that CUDP had no commonly agreed decision-making principles and procedures during the time leading-up to the day of election.[26] He said that the day-to-day affairs of the party were done on the basis of “mutual trust” and this eventually gave rise to “personalized leadership”. Moreover, CUDP had neither the resources nor the organizational infrastructure to orient and prepare its candidates across the country. According to Birhanu, there were even candidates who had taken initiatives in their own to self-nominate and run local election campaigns. Similar experiences were encountered by UEDF as well. It is therefore not surprising that both coalition parties suffered from internal divisions during the post-election political crisis (discussed later). At present CUDP has been split into three groups: UEDP-Medhin, CUDP itself and another splinter group composed of those who have refused to enter parliament in protest against the imprisonment of CUDP leaders. Diaspora-based UEDF members also withdrew from the UEDF coalition because of disagreements over political strategies.

            Compared to the resource-rich ruling party, opposition parties suffer from resource poverty. It can be true that parties in Ethiopia have no experience of fund raising, but the fact of the matter is that party members – no matter how devoted they are – may not afford to make financial contributions (the poverty factor). The only significant source of support is the Diaspora, but this source has slowly dried up as a result of strained relations between Diaspora-based groups and opposition parties. 

While the ruling party controls the functions of federal and regional states - thus, by default, having presence in any locality across Ethiopia -, opposition parties have no visibility outside of the capital city, Addis Ababa. It could be that opposition politicians prefer to work in Addis Ababa with the watchful eyes of the international community (for fear of harassment and intimidation by local officials of the ruling party) or that they lack resources to open and maintain offices in regional and local towns. In my view, both are important factors. There are powerful local ruling party officials who may prevent the activities of opposition parties, especially if they criticize the policies and practices of the ruling party. The financial situation of opposition parties has already been mentioned above. 

The Election

By a developing country standard, the 2005 Ethiopian election campaign was free and fair. There were no restrictions in the registration of political parties wanting to contest during the election. Opposition parties were provided with access to the state-controlled media and there were televised public debates. Despite lacking the confidence of the opposition parties, the NEBE had a strong mandate to oversee the election. Relations among political parties were generally good until they all started to engage in what Terrence Lyons calls “bad-faith strategies” of political campaigns.[27] Hard-line opposition politicians and supporters, especially those based in the Diaspora, wanted nothing more than the removal of the ruling party, EPRDF, from power and so they made effective use of the modern media to attack and discredit the party including labeling Meles Zenawi and other leaders  “Tigreans” (from a Tigrean ethnic group) and accusing them of favouring their own ethnic group. EPRDF officials, in turn, showed no tolerance for this and responded by labeling their critics die-hard Amharas (an ethnic group which had dominated Ethiopian politics) and criminals (referring to former government officials) who might even be thinking of planning a Rwandan-like ethnic genocide. In one of its statements, the Carter Centre, which had sent 50 election observers to Ethiopia, pointed out “while the campaign started out at a high level, focusing on issues rather than personalities, it degenerated in the final week into charges and countercharges of engaging in ‘hate speech’.[28] The EPRDF's likening the opposition to Rwanda’s interhamwe is as, or more, regrettable as are some opposition slurs against the Tigrayans in the ruling party.” Nonetheless, the Carter Center also observed:

There were more open debates, including a long series of widely-discussed live televised debates. Opposition parties benefited from guaranteed access to the state-owned electronic media. Candidates campaigned widely and effectively. Most dramatically, the electoral campaign climaxed in its final week with large and peaceful campaign rallies.

All political parties did not show creativity during their election campaigns with respect to developing forward-looking policy agenda. For instance, considering the strength and political experience of EPRDF, the ruling elites did not talk about forward-looking vision or frameworks of how the Ethiopian people could participate in the development process. Instead, they appeared to be focused on letting everyone know how much they had achieved on the development front such as the expansion of public services across the country and market liberalization. Likewise, opposition parties had no clear agenda of their own and they instead focused on attacking EPRDF’s policies and practices, such as potential risks of the present ethnic-based federal system (e.g., fragmentation of national society); EPRDF’s facilitation of Eritrean separation; human rights violations; and lack of progress in poverty reduction.

There was a huge voter turn out on election day, May 15, 2005. Ethiopians patiently waited in long lines to cast their votes. Despite incidents of intimidation of opposition supporters and logistical problems, for the most part the situation across the country was calm and peaceful. But controversies emerged when the media began reporting earlier results in Addis Ababa area. Opposition parties were surprised to learn that they had won all of the seats in the capital city. This made them realize the possibility of winning across the country and forming a majority government. EPRDF officials panicked at this situation, and in what appeared to be an attempt to re-assure their supporters, they went public to declare that they had won a majority. This statement would then trigger a post-election political stalemate: how did EPRDF officials know about the results at a time when the counting of ballots was not even completed across the country? The opposition thus alleged that EPRDF was deliberately manipulating election results in its favour. The ruling party also filed its own complaints alleging that some of its members had lost because of opposition-orchestrated fraud. Added to the rising political temperature was the killing by government security forces of angry opposition supporters who went out on the street to protest against the alleged election fraud. International observers could do little except to plead to all parties to calm down until all votes were counted and certified by NEBE. Ambassadors of donor countries based in Addis Ababa worked hard to open communications between the ruling and opposition parties. In spite of the success of bringing all parties together for a roundtable dialogue, the ruling and opposition party officials failed to reach a compromise. In fact, both parties became increasingly deadlocked in issuing threats and counter-threats: the ruling party directly or indirectly warned against the consequences if opposition parties continued to reject the election results, while opposition parties threatened to call mass strikes and organize civil disobedience throughout the country unless the ruling party agreed to investigate election fraud in nearly 300 constituencies.

After examining the disputes lodged by both the ruling and opposition parties, NEBE agreed to organize a re-run of election for 31 seats across the country. The results showed that EPRDF had won all the seats and this reinforced the belief by the opposition parties that they had been cheated. They questioned the neutrality of the NEBE and the whole electoral system.

When the NEBE announced final results, EPRDF had won 327 seats, CUDP 109 seats, UEDF 52 seats and the remaining 38 seats went to eight smaller parties and an independent member of parliament. Women occupy almost half of the parliamentary seats for EPRDF.[29] The opposition parties increase their seats to 172 from 12 seats in 2000. 

The European Union Election Observation Mission reported that this election had failed to meet international standards[30], while the African Union stated that the election was free and fair.[31] The Carter Centre observed that, while there were irregularities during the counting of ballots including intimidation and harassment of opposition supporters,  “the majority of the constituency results based on the May 15 polling and tabulations are credible and reflect competitive conditions”.[32] The Ethiopian government had alleged that the European Union Mission was responsible for sparking violent urban protests by leaking a report that speculated the opposition winning a majority, hence, reinforcing the belief among opposition supporters that the opposition lost because of massive election fraud. The government accused the Head of the Mission Anna Gomez of siding with the opposition. As a result, relations between the Ethiopian government and European Union were strained before being restored.

In preparation for the opening of the new parliament in November 2005, opposition parties debated to decide whether or not they should enter parliament to take up their seats. Meanwhile, there was another round of protest in major urban areas and government security forces shot and killed protesters again. Amid this situation, some elected opposition members decided to boycott the parliament upon which they were stripped of their parliamentary immunity. The government arrested the entire leadership of CUDP accusing them of organizing Ukrainian-style orange revolution to overthrow a constitutionally mandated government. They were released in August 2007. The government also set up an Independent Inquiry Commission whose report indicated that 193 people had died during the clashes between government security forces and protestors, but it fell short of blaming the government for using excessive force to deal with the situation.[33]

It is important to note the role of the Ethiopian Diaspora as well. Opposition parties had been dependent on financial support from the Diaspora. EPRDF officials then alleged that some Diaspora groups - particular former government officials - were using the financial muscle of the Diaspora to promote politics of hate. Indeed, such Diaspora groups had encouraged elected opposition members not to enter parliament and they actually called those who entered parliament “traitors”. When UEDF decided to enter parliament, Diaspora-based UEDF groups orchestrated the “firing” of the leaders, as it is evident from the following press release:

The Executive Committee of the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces…has relieved Dr. Beyene Petros and Dr. Merera Gudina, of their responsibilities as the Chairman and First Vice Chairman of UEDF, respectively. The Executive Committee reached its decision after extensive deliberation and after establishing the fact that the Chairman and First Vice Chairman acted in contravention of the decisions (i.e., not to enter parliament) of both the National Council and the Executive Committee of UEDF.[34]

Beyene Petros responded by saying that this action had no “political basis” and that “his party had come to understand the dictatorial and extreme positions of some Diaspora politicians”.  He added that, while UEDF might lose Diaspora financial support, it would not  “compromise on people's votes”.[35]

Since the opening of the new parliament in November 2005, there have been ongoing negotiations to develop mutually acceptable rules and procedures governing the conduct of business of the Ethiopian parliament including the enactment of the Code of Conduct and Rules of Parliament.[36] Recently, all parties also agreed on the need to reform the structure and procedures of NEBE.[37] Ethiopians are also increasingly becoming accustomed to heated parliamentary debates on national issues. For example, in July 2006, there was a heated exchange between ruling and opposition parties over an auditor general’s report that found misspending by regional states. In December 2006, there was a debate on the situation in Somalia. We thought that all opposition parties were behind the government when major opposition parties came out to express their concern about the threats posed by the Union of Islamic Courts. But, when the government introduced a resolution in the parliament to get an authorization for military action, all but one major opposition party voted against it. The ruling party blamed the opposition parties for their usual uncooperative behaviour, while opposition officials blamed the government for showing no flexibility in addressing their concerns in the draft resolution – yet parliamentary democracy was working.  In a recent public lecture, CUDP parliamentary whip Temesgen Zewde said that there were new changes in the current parliament such as an increase in the number of Standing Committees from 12 to 13; appointment of one opposition member as a chair and two others as deputy chairs of Standing Committees; and an increase in the number of opposition members of Standing Committees from 13 to 20.[38] All these are important conditions that facilitate the maturation of Ethiopia’s democracy.

Lessons Learned

Staffan Lindberg rightly points out that, while elections in Africa are not perfect, they bring about positive effects on democratization. He writes “the repeated holding of elections in new electoral regimes promotes and breeds democratic qualities: The more successive elections, the more democratic a nation becomes”. [39] The Ethiopian experience supports this argument. For instance, the 2005 election further promoted political pluralism by increasing the number of seats for opposition parties to 172 from 12 seats in 2000.  Since the opening of the new parliament in November 2005, the ruling and opposition parties have continued to engage in dialogue around formulating mutually acceptable rules and procedures governing the functions of the parliament. However, the Ethiopian election was marred by an election controversy with dire consequences including violent street protests that caused the loss of life and damage of property worth millions of dollars.  In this section, we attempt to identify some of the remaining issues that further inform our understanding of the opportunities and challenges that are inherent in the democratisation process.

Political tensions started to simmer shortly after the votes in Addis Ababa were counted and following reports of unexpected sweeping victory by opposition parties. As opposition leaders were getting excited about their victory, the ruling party went public to announce that it had won a majority before the NEBE had confirmed the results. Did this create a suspicion by the opposition that perhaps the ruling party was engaged in massive election fraud across the country in order to manipulate the results in its favour? Did opposition leaders overreacted by assuming that if they had won in Addis Ababa, they could have also won across the country?

We do not intend to enter into this whole debate of who or what caused the post-election crisis; besides, post-election controversies are quite common (even in matured democracies) except that some countries can manage them peacefully while other countries like Ethiopia cannot. Our interest here is to attempt to explain why Ethiopian politicians (collectively) failed to manage the crisis. In my view, a large part of this had to do with the prevalence of bitter political enmities in Ethiopian society. For instance, some former government officials actively participating in the opposition movements had a deep-seated hatred towards the ruling elites, because they were displaced from power when EPRDF toppled the military-socialist regime in 1991. The propagation of “election fraud” thus gave rise to mutual suspicion and distrust. As opposition parties increasingly came to rely on the mediation of foreigners to resolve the post-election crisis, the ruling EPRDF elites understood this as a deliberate action by some of their former enemies to tarnish the image of their party. What had made them angrier –they also had pubic support on this – was the action of vocal Diaspora opposition supporters who organized mass protests in major Western cities calling donor countries to cut aid to Ethiopia and isolate the EPRDF government. EPRDF officials would increasingly adapt uncompromising positions and develop a negative attitude towards foreigners. The personal attack on the head of the European Election Observation Mission Ana Gomez was an example. The government accused Gomez of first leaking her report to opposition parties – this allegedly sparked the June 2005 street violence - and then supporting their cause.[40]  The lesson in all of this is that, in post-conflict political environments like Ethiopia’s, political reconciliation is a precondition for achieving political stability and a successful multiparty election. Too often we tend to think that once peace agreements are signed, political settlements are reached or, in the case of Ethiopia, if a repressive regime is replaced (by force), political discourse would return to normalcy. The Ethiopian experience shows that such thinking could be misleading. When former “enemies” contest during elections, bitter historical enmities could resurface on the political arena. 

            In matured democratic societies, there are strong independent entities that make objective assessments of electoral processes. For example, pollsters, media analysts and scholars closely follow election campaigns and assess potential outcomes such as which parties could win majority governments. In developing countries like Ethiopia, however, political parties and their supporters often make over-exaggerated predictions in their favour. These can create unrealistic expectations, and should parties lose elections, they may dispute the results or their supporters go out on the streets (to protest).  I am not trying to downplay the concerns of the Ethiopian opposition parties about possible election fraud; in fact, they were convinced that they had been cheated. I am trying to point to the need for building the capacity of media, civil society, pollsters and other independent entities, which conduct objective assessments of the trends and issues during electoral processes so that citizens have clear anticipations of the outcomes. In Ethiopia, the Initiative Africa (IA) had conducted, in 2004, the first ever pre-election nation-wide survey that showed that EPRDF would win a majority. But opposition supporter discredited the results of this survey by claiming that IA was biased in favour of EPRDF.[41]  It was unfortunate that this important initiative was not appreciated. 

Clearly, the opposition parties entered the 2005 election race without a solid organizational capacity. This was evident from the failure of coalition members of CUDP and UEDF to act as a cohesive unit in the aftermath of the post-election crisis. In particular, lack of internal rules and procedures of decision-making led to a complete breakdown of party discipline to the extent of party leaders going public to make contradictory statements. Instead of dwelling on the past here, let us look to the future and talk about capacity needs. The most important aspect of party capacity building is the creation of adequate organizational resources. We reproduce the task requirements of a job poster for a party staff illustrated earlier to stress this point. A typical political party would need staff capable of recruiting and motivating volunteers who would go out to communities to market its political agenda; briefing media and responding to public inquires; maintaining membership records and analysing the electoral roll; organizing and leading fund raising campaigns; and managing the day-to-day activities of the party. Moreover, a party also needs qualified experts who advise politicians on policies and programs being carried out across the country.

Unless Ethiopian opposition parties have such resources, they cannot effectively participate in political and decision-making processes. They may not be able to rely on the financial contributions of members who themselves struggle to make ends meet. Relying on Diaspora sources turned out to have some risks since powerful interest groups attempt to use their financial muscle to influence party policies and practices in ways that do not promote the democratization process in Ethiopian; for example, there are groups who support armed struggle to overthrow the ruling party.[42] Therefore, the Ethiopian parliament should enact laws that allow political parties to receive government financial assistance. Even in rich countries like Canada, political parties get public support. According to Elections Canada “To be eligible, a party must have received in the general election preceding the quarter: 1) at least 2 percent of the valid votes cast, or 2) at least 5 percent of the valid votes cast in the electoral districts in which the party endorsed a candidate”.  The amount of funding is determined 1) “$0.4375 multiplied by the total number of valid votes cast in the general election preceding the quarter, and 2) by the inflation adjustment factor for the quarter”.[43] This system can work in Ethiopia.

4. Conclusion

This article has attempted to illustrate the process of a national election in Ethiopia along with the discussion of the factors affecting its outcome. In doing so, it contributes to the growing body of knowledge on the role of political parties in the promotion of democracy. There is no doubt that the 2005 Ethiopian election would be remembered for its bitter controversies and the tragic death of innocent people during the violent street protests. In fact, the issues were so complicated that even international observers held differing views, with the European Union Mission accusing the ruling party of vote rigging while the Americans and the African Union felt that, despite the problems, the election results were legitimate. I have no intention of blaming any party. However, obviously, the political environment and the organizational capacity of Ethiopian political parties were important factors. Did the political environment limit the capacity of parties or the behaviour of parties (as a function of their capacity) contributed to the creation of the intense political environment? The preceding discussion has shown that both were mutually reinforcing factors that influenced the outcome of the election.

At present the political situation in the country has improved as both the ruling and opposition parties continue to engage in dialogue around formulating mutually acceptable rules and procedures governing the functions of the Ethiopian parliament. This is a crucial step towards building mutual confidence on parliamentary democracy. Let us also hope that all political parties will come together to reflect on their collective experience of the 2005 election and appreciate the lessons learned. The capacity needs of opposition parties must be addressed.

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